There is an old and not unfamiliar adage that
says, ''When the guns roar, the muses are silent,''
and while the legal muses have been unable to
prevent the war on Iraq, it is still appropriate to
determine whether the conflict conforms to
international humanitarian law.
The United States' resort to force might arguably
appear justifiable against one of the most murderous
and tyrannical regimes. For more than 20 years,
Saddam Hussein has sought not only to acquire
weapons of mass destruction but has used them. He
gassed thousands of his own people at Halabja, while
"cleansing" Marsh Arabs after the first
Persian Gulf war. He launched two catastrophic wars,
sacrificing nearly a million Iraqis and killing or
wounding more than a million Iranians. He threatened
to incinerate Israel in 1990 and, today, finances
suicide bombers.
During the past 12 years, he has violated 16
United Nations resolutions that found him to be in
material breach of his disarmament obligations, with
Security Council Resolution 1441 being his
"last opportunity" to comply. But while he
is clearly a war criminal and the personification of
evil -- an inviting target for a "just
war" -- this does not necessarily authorize the
use of force against him, unless it's in accord with
the basic principles of international law.
The first principle, grounded in the UN Charter,
is the prohibition of the use of force, save two
exceptions: the exercise of the right of
self-defence in response to an armed attack as
mandated under Article 51 of the Charter; and the
right of the Security Council, under Chapter 7, to
authorize military action. A third, emerging
exception -- humanitarian intervention to avert
international crimes such as genocide or crimes
against humanity -- arguably requires Security
Council authorization, which was sought before
intervention in Kosovo.
President George W. Bush argues that the United
States has a right of pre-emptive self-defence, that
in a post-Sept. 11 universe with its convergence of
terrorism, weapons of mass destruction and rogue
states, awaiting an armed attack can convert the UN
Charter into a suicide pact. But even allowing for a
more flexible interpretation of the right of
self-defence, there must be at least credible
evidence of imminence of such an attack, which has
not been adduced.
Both Mr. Bush and British Prime Minister Tony
Blair also argue that, since Iraq has been in
material breach of Security Council resolutions,
including 1441, then "serious
consequences" ensue, including the use of
force. This leads to the second principle:
Resolution 1441 as a basic juridical framework for
appreciating the legalities.
It appears that 1441 is more cited than
understood. Under the resolution, only the Security
Council, not a state or coalition of states, can
determine whether there has been a material breach,
what serious consequences ensue, and if the use of
force is justified. The Security Council made no
such determination, and a second resolution to that
effect did not secure support from even a majority
of its members.
A third, related principle is that of the
"exhaustion of remedies short of war,"
where the UN Charter requires that only if other
measures have proved to be inadequate can force be
authorized. This principle is not unrelated to the
law of unintended consequences. War is, at best,
unpredictable. This principle is a protective
antidote to war's unintended consequences.
The fourth principle -- the invocation of the
Kosovo precedent -- is organized around the doctrine
of humanitarian intervention. But no Security
Council or multilateral support was even sought, let
alone sanctioned for this doctrine, as in Kosovo.
A fifth principle -- accountability -- has been
ignored thus far. But this is particularly important
now that war has begun. International humanitarian
law principles are clear in what is permissible
regarding conduct during hostilities. The use of
weapons in any armed conflict must be proportional
to the threat; must respect the principle of
civilian immunity; must not cause unnecessary or
aggravated suffering to combatants; and must not
cause severe and long-term damage to the
environment.
Saddam Hussein has violated all these and more,
and should have been indicted long ago for his
international crimes, an option I recommended even
before the first gulf war and which might have
pre-empted his continuing criminality.
Finally, we come to the principle of retroactive
validity. This is perhaps the most compelling one
that may operate in favour of Mr. Bush and his
coalition. If the war uncovers weapons of mass
destruction, exposes Iraq's deception, and is
supported by the Iraqi people, it may well be that
the legal niceties surrounding the use of force will
be overtaken by post-invasion validation.
It may be regarded as trivial to deal with legal
niceties now that war has begun. But it is important
to recall that Mr. Bush and Mr. Blair, to their
credit, argued the case for the use of force
pursuant to international law principles and
regarded Resolution 1441 and preceding UN
resolutions as the juridical basis underpinning
their actions. International law, then, is a
relevant framework for assessing the validity of
their actions. Now that war has begun, norms of
international humanitarian law remain an important
benchmark to determine the legality of the conduct
of hostilities.
Irwin Cotler, Liberal MP for Mount Royal, is
chair of the foreign affairs subcommittee on human
rights and international development. He is
on leave from McGill University, where he
specializes in human-rights law.