P.S. Thanks to SARAH J. GABIG, Capt, USAF, who's response I include below.
As psychological phenomena, historical beliefs are components of self-identity, are powerful motivators, and are resistant to new information. Cognitive history is the interdisciplinary study of the psychology of historical beliefs, including mechanisms of misbelief suggested by Ichheiser's theories of social perception. This study examines the Canadian avoidance of evidence of threatening actions by the United States. The method of study is to examine public reports of hostile behaviors by agencies of the U.S. government in order to show the regularity with which Canadians have dismissed such reports without seeking to confirm or disconfirm them. Various explanations for this blind-eye behavior are consistent with Bayes' Theorem of conditional probability. Numerous recent examples of evidently hostile behavior are cited to support the conclusion that the contemporary history of U.S.-Canadian relations is incomplete and maybe incorrect, to a degree unknown until cognitive mechanisms of misperception are understood enough to allow historical facts to be freely sought and evaluated.
History is a very psychological discipline, and it is remarkable that there has been so little interdisciplinary collaboration between history and psychology (1). To be sure, historical explanations of the causes of past events usually include inferences about the motivations and the decision processes of the individuals involved. Two sub-fields of history --the "mentalité" tradition of ethnohistory and the new focus on "social memory"-- both have psychological aspects (2). When psychological methods have been used more overtly and formally in history, the focus has been on explaining the psychological development of important individuals or groups of individuals. This is called "psychohistory" if inferences are based on Freudian interpretations and "historiometry" if inferences are based on statistical studies of multiple cases (3).
But the role of psychology in history is not remote, not limited to far-away peoples or to dead personalities from the past. Historical beliefs are psychologically active in the heads of all of us who are alive today. Beliefs about history strongly influence our thinking and our behavior, especially political behavior. Thus, many governments find it important to control school history curriculums and textbooks. History is psychologically intimate to us. We identify ourselves by history. We possess and are possessed by history. When we say, "I am an American," "I am a German," "I am a Jew", we attach national histories to our personal biographies. The political slogan, "Je me souviens", inscribed on Quebec license plates means "I remember", referring to the 18th century conquest of New France by the English (4). This is a psychological claim that testifies to the intimacy of history with psychology and political action. It is predictable, perhaps self-evident, that national history and personal memory might become confused in our cognitive processes.
Because historical beliefs are bound to psychology, they are bound by psychology and thus relatively resistant to new information (5). To change an historical belief often requires that we must also change many other cognitions in our minds. It would be easier, for example, to consider and accept evidence that the moon has an atmosphere, than it would be for various readers to consider and accept evidence that only in 1879 were the Ryukyu Islands (Okinawa) first annexed to Japan (6), that in 1917 to 1920, Stalin supported Finland's independence from Russia (7), or that in 1934, the U.S. government authorized the immediate first-use of poison gas against Canadians in the event of war (8). Historical beliefs are powerful motivators and play a central role in our psychological readiness for war. All over the world, from Rwanda to Israel to Bosnia to Armenia, Chechnya, Iraq, India, Indonesia, people will risk death and dare the destruction of their own communities in order to assert their historical beliefs (9). Yet, for all of this, historical beliefs have rarely been the focus of systematic study.
There is need for the development of a sub-field called "cognitive history", to be defined as the interdisciplinary study of the psychology of historical beliefs (10). Austrian psychologist, Fritz Heider, one of the founders of cognitive social psychology, was perhaps the first to suggest this:
"One should write history as a development of 'beliefs' (not in the narrow religious sense), as a description of the succession and changes in the world pictures, the world images. The changes in cognitive maps, the life spaces."(11)
The focus should be on the contents and the internal structure of historical beliefs and on their dynamics, meaning their acquisition, disposition, and interaction with motivations, emotions, and other beliefs and behaviors. As cognitive phenomena, beliefs are held by individuals, but often collectively within national groups, within ethnic and religious minorities, and within specialist communities such as historians. Thus, beliefs can be studied at both the individual and the group levels. Furthermore, cognitive history can be approached from a variety of disciplines, including history, psychology, political science, sociology, anthropology, philosophy, literature, and communication studies. The methodologies of these various disciplines are all reasonable approaches to understanding historical beliefs.
Beliefs, of course, are difficult to study since they are essentially private, internal, phenomena. Beliefs cannot be directly observed. They must be inferred from behaviors and self-reports, both written and oral. When our beliefs are widely shared, they are doubly difficult to observe since we tend to be unaware of our beliefs without some contrasting points of external reference. Historical beliefs stand out dramatically as beliefs, and thus potential misbeliefs, when neighboring societies endorse contrary histories, as with the well-known example of Canadian schools teaching that the United States lost the War of 1812 and U.S. schools teaching that the United States won. Historical beliefs also stand out dramatically when new information is systematically ignored or tabooed, indicating that there is incompatibility with established beliefs that are actively maintaining their priority within our unconscious system of cognitive organization.
Beliefs about national history seem to follow the cognitive forms and dynamics that shape our perceptions of persons. We often speak about nations as though they were individual personalities, as in, "The United States did such and such," or "America thought that..." or "Washington hoped to...". In many cases, we have explicitly personified nations as human characters, in the case of the United States, as "Uncle Sam". Heider has noted that interpersonal psychology underlies our perceptions of nations:
"Nations are in some ways like persons, and it is common to apply to them the person-concept which we have developed in the commerce with individuals."(12)
Thus, it might be hypothesized that the normal psychological processes of perception and misperception that operate when we think about individual people also operate when we think about nations. A remembered national history is a socially constructed memory of a nation's "personal" behavior. Our cognitive schemas, whether of persons or of nations, are built from beliefs and are routinely wrong, maybe for similar reasons.
There is a vast social psychology literature on person perception (13). Polish psychologist, Gustav Ichheiser, is the pioneer on topics of misperception in interpersonal relations, and his phenomenological analyses might have easiest application to cognitive history (14). Many of his mechanisms of misbelief in interpersonal relations have become standard theories in social psychology, and four of these may help explain misbeliefs in national history:
a) We tend to attribute greater reality to visible events than to invisible events. We have confidence in, and can communicate about, observations open to common, collective perception. We thus put an epistemological premium on visibility. Ichheiser wrote:
"...the raw material of social perception, that is, the data which serve as a basis of those interpretations and misinterpretations shaping the image of personality, belong altogether to the collectively perceivable world."(15)
This tendency, however, readies us to miss or to misinterpret important events because they are not immediately perceptible. Ichheiser noted this to be a problem in history:
"The point we wish to make is that in the world of common sense in which, after all, we are emotionally at home, it is the visible aspects of social relations which impress us as 'social reality.' Coercion, for instance, is usually recognized as coercion by those not directly involved (by the 'neutral spectators') only when it takes the visible form of outright violence...Historical experience shows it to be possible for a long period of time to conceal, or even to deny, the existence of such social realities... They can be concealed, at least from the awareness of neutral observers, as long as these realities can be kept below the threshold of social visibility."(16)
Thus, outright war is historically visible and undoubtedly real. But preparation for war is much less visible and therefore more easily dismissed as unreal, even though the latter is often more effective as a coercive force in international relations.
b) Our mental images of different people, and of different nations, are cognitive schemas constructed for their helpfulness in organizing perception and memory and in communicating among people who share those schemas. They are first created from early experience and from social norms. For example, my image of my father as decisive and hardworking comes from my childhood experiences with him and from my mother's and siblings' communicated ideas of what he is like. My image of the United States is similarly constructed. Once structured, cognitive schemas are like projections from the mind onto the world, or like mental templates. They feel like reality, but are in fact fabrications. They ready us for misperception by focusing us on information that fits and by causing us to ignore information that does not fit. Ichheiser argued:
"[Mechanisms of social perceptions] function so as to transcend in many way and in many directions the pure raw material and to construct out of this material a more or less well-organized and integrated image of the given personality. This image construction is usually endowed in our minds with only those alleged characteristics which promise to help us explain, as a manifestation of the underlying personality, the behavior with which we are confronted. In other words, we have the tendency to consider a partial structure of personality which happens to be visible to us as if this partial structure were the total personality itself."(17)
When trying to explain the behavior of people, and perhaps of nations, a little, early evidence goes too far. Furthermore, these errors of omission subsequently cause, and are compounded by, errors of commission.
c) Cognitive schemas ready us for misperception by over-estimating the unity and the consistency of the personality across the life-history of the individual. Schemas are relatively static impositions on dynamic reality and create the appearance of consistency over time (18). Again, we tend to ignore or to misinterpret information that has become dissonant with prior, established schemas. Ichheiser wrote:
"Once the image of another person, shaped by primary mechanisms of one kind or another, is fixed in our minds, we tend either to overlook all factors in the other person which do not fit into our preconceived scheme; or, else, we misinterpret all unexpectedly emerging factors in order to preserve our preformed misconceptions."(19)
This was not a new idea. For example, 40 years earlier, American psychologist and philosopher, William James, had already written:
"The point I now urge you to observe particularly is the part played by the older truths... Their influence is absolutely controlling. Loyalty to them is the first principle --in most cases the only principle; for by far the most usual way of handling phenomena so novel that they would make for a serious rearrangement of our preconception is to ignore them altogether, or to abuse those who bear witness to them."(20)
The misattribution of qualities consistent with an overall image, and the dismissal of information that is dissonant, is nowadays called "the halo effect", and psychological research shows that our memory is impaired for information that contradicts our constructed preconceptions of a person (21). Perhaps, by analogy, our history is impaired for information that contradicts our constructed preconceptions of a nation.
d) We tend to behave "in fact" quite differently from how we think we would behave "in principle". Our abstract, rational understanding of the cognitive processes behind our beliefs may not describe our actual belief processes. Ichheiser wrote:
"The views, or interpretations, 'in principle' are those we hold, or perform, about social facts and issues in a generalized, so to speak, 'philosophical' way, that is, as long as we are not faced by any necessity for doing something about those facts and issues... Our views and interpretations 'in fact,' on the other hand, are those which actually determine our actions and reactions when confronted by certain situations and issues."(22)
We misunderstand our own cognitive processes, and these misunderstandings may stand as rationalizations. Thus, our actual belief behaviors are more telling than are our own explanations of our beliefs. We may know that historical beliefs should be based on careful judgments of evidence, and believe that our own beliefs are, but still be quite unaware that particular beliefs are, in fact, the results of routine cognitive processes that are prone to error.
The psychological processes described here are conceived to be normal, automatic, and necessarily prone to error, especially when we think or act in habitual ways. To overcome errors caused by routine cognitive processes requires, first, awareness of these tendencies, and second, extra-ordinary and deliberate efforts. Effortless, easy beliefs are the ones to be doubted and double checked.
The following are brief accounts of publicized U.S. military actions; these accounts reported actions evidently hostile to Canada and that were known to Canadians, or easily could have been known, but were apparently incompatible with Canadian beliefs in the goodwill of the United States. In such conflicts between beliefs and observations, it seems that the beliefs were retained and the observations dismissed, as would be predicted by Ichheiser's cognitive theories of misperception.
Richard Preston's 1977 book, The Defence of the Undefended Border: Plans for War in North America, 1867-1939 (23), is the foremost source of information on U.S. military planning against Canada. One of Preston's methods for discovering evidence of military planning along the "undefended border" was to search the contemporary military trade journals. In a 1910 issue of the United States Army and Navy Journal and Gazette, he found a disclaimer that the headline "Canadian Army Crushed," appearing in the New York City newspaper, The Sun, was just a news reporter's joke, that the military manoeuvres it referred to were not directed at Canada (29). These manoeuvres had taken place at Pine Camp, the present site of Fort Drum, in Upstate New York, near the Canadian border. In fact, The Sun had been routinely and matter-of-factly reporting that these manoeuvres were practicing for war with Canada (30). The headline in question was a quotation from the field report of a Capt. Paul M. Malone of the 27th Infantry. No joke.
An examination of Montreal and Kingston newspapers for the week immediately following the headline found no mention of the incident. Preston himself accepted the disclaimer and wrote into history that the Gazette had
"...learned that the word 'Canada' had not appeared in the operational orders for the manoeuvres and that a newspaper correspondent had been trying to be 'funny' and had 'made a mess of it'."(31)
Preston had accepted this explanation even though he had evidently not even examined the original news reports, as demonstrated by the fact that he had copied the Gazette's error of omitting the word "is" from The Sun's true headline: "Canadian Army Is Crushed."
Preston's readiness to accept the U.S. military's disclaimer of hostile behavior also seems to have prevented him from seeking further evidence about the event and from linking it to other discoveries. He might have wondered, for example, if manoeuvres practicing for war with Canada were at all related to paper plans designing war with Canada. More specifically, were the same officers involved in both activities? In fact, the first military manoeuvres ever held at Pine Camp were in 1908, and they, too, had been reported in newspapers as practicing for war with Canada (32). Several of the officers participating in those manoeuvres subsequently prepared plans for the invasion of Canada and do appear in Preston's book (33): Capt. Alexander Dade of the 13th Cavalry compiled geographic information on Canada, emphasized the strategic importance of the St. Lawrence canals, and recommended that they be quickly seized if war seemed imminent; Maj. David Baker, Jr. of the 11th Infantry prepared plans for concentrated attacks on Montreal and Quebec City; Maj. William Hay of the 10th Cavalry co-authored the most detailed and sophisticated invasion plans to date, calling for U.S. forces to cross the St.Lawrence River at Cornwall. These officers were all listed in the Army's souvenir pamphlet for the 1908 manoeuvres at Pine Camp (34). Therefore, yes, U.S. military officers planning for war with Canada were also practicing for war with Canada, and Preston might have discovered this had he not been predisposed to accept the U.S. Army's dismissal of the news report.
Confirmation that military manoeuvres and strategic planning were coordinated might have led Preston to look for more concrete preparations for war against Canada, for example, base construction. In fact, the 1908 manoeuvres had been held on leased land, which in 1909 was purchased by the U.S. Army for the creation of a new military base near the Canadian border, south of Ottawa, despite complaints that the price was too high and that the site was unsuitable for military manoeuvres (35).
The New York Times Index was used to seek for other U.S. military manoeuvres that Preston's methods of search might have missed. This led to the 1915 summer manoeuvres at Plattsburgh, New York, near the border south of Montreal (36). According to the news reports, the war game enacted a Blue army invading a foreign country defended by Red, causing Red to counter-invade Blue, but with Blue forces prevailing in a final battle fought right on the Canadian border. Local newspaper reports did not disguise the fact that Red represented military forces defending Canada:
"The Blue army today won a decisive victory over the Reds after a desperate struggle in which the Reds were driven from their entrenched position and compelled to fall back to the Canadian line."(37)
An examination of the Montreal Star and the Montreal Gazette found no account of these military manoeuvres a mere 40 miles to the south of the city. This was another unnoticed public event of U.S. hostile behavior, unnoticed in its day and unnoticed in subsequent history, possibly because it is incompatible with the presumptions of trust and good-will required by the Canada-U.S. partnership as military allies in WWI and WWII.
Again, Preston might himself have sought and found evidence of the 1915 manoeuvres or other concrete preparations for war. But he apparently had made a prior decision that no inferences follow from the war plans he was discovering. These include: 1) a 1913 document entitled, Invasion of Canada (Canadian War Plan), which proposed a staging area in Moira, New York, a little to the west of the 1915 manoeuvres site; 2) a 1914 Military Geography of Eastern Canada and a Study of an Invasion Plan by United States Forces; 3) a 1915 invasion plan by Brig.-Gen. M.M. Macomb approved by the U.S. Army's Chief of Staff; and 4) a 1916 invasion map showing U.S. troops crossing from northern New York to capture Ottawa and Montreal (38). The discovery that the U.S. planned war on Canada, even as Canada was fighting for the Allies in Europe in WWI, cannot overcome the set schema or image of the U.S. as an ally with Canada in WWI and WWII. Rather than new facts causing new hypotheses and a search for further facts, the science of history here falters and is halted. History seen with a blind-eye is bound by the psychology of beliefs.
Despite beliefs about how military allies should behave, the United States revived in 1919 its programs of military planning for war with Canada. Care had been taken to keep such preparations from Canadian awareness. For example, in 1928, the four decade old practice of "Hunting and Fishing Leave" was discontinued as a cover for military espionage in Canada, and in 1929, U.S. officers were ordered "not to cross the border during the Quebec reconnaissance" because it might attract unwanted attention (39). Nevertheless, continuing signs of war preparations were there to be seen, public, obvious.
In 1935, the U.S. Government Printing Office, by mistake, published the full transcripts of secret testimony given to the House Armed Services Committee by the most senior U.S. officers responsible for strategic planning: Brig.-Gen. C. Kilbourne, Head of the War Plans Division, Gen. F.M. Andrews, Commander of the Army Air Force, Col. W. Krueger, Assistant Chief of Staff serving the Joint Board, and Capt. H.L. George, from the Air Corps Practice School. These officers argued that three new air bases were needed for surprise attacks against air fields in Canada. The new bases on the east and west coasts were to be described as coastal defence bases, and the one in the Great Lakes region was to be camouflaged as a civilian airport but "capable of dominating the industrial heart of Canada" (40).
The transcripts were published at the end of April, 1935, and made headline news for several days (41). U.S. President Roosevelt denied any military planning against Canada and spoke of "permanent peace", "generations of friendship", and the "disarmament of our three thousand miles of common boundary". Roosevelt claimed that the military officers involved had been presenting personal opinions, not national policy. Despite the President's denials, however, these base recommendations were consistent with War Plan RED, which was national military policy at that time, approved by the U.S. Secretary of War and Secretary of Navy. In any case, the greatest force of Roosevelt's reaction was directed at Congress. He threatened Congress that if it could not keep military secrets, then he would forbid military officers to testify in Congress. Two weeks after Roosevelt's statement, his Secretary of War and Secretary of Navy approved amendments to War Plan RED making military offensives against Vancouver and Winnipeg a higher priority, and two months after Roosevelt's statement, he recommended General Kilbourne for promotion (42).
For the present thesis, Canadian responses were more revealing than were the revelations of the testimony. Hume Wrong, senior diplomat at the Canadian Legation, asked the U.S. State Department for copies of the transcripts but emphasized to the press "that he had asked for no documents or data considered secret or confidential" (43). From Ottawa, the official response was that the Canadian government "had been disposed from the first not to take the matter seriously except for its possible effect on Canadian public opinion" (44). Sir George Perley, acting Prime Minister, affirmed Canadian beliefs that the U.S. is a predictable personality with a disposition for good-will:
"No one in Canada believed the Government of the United States had any intentions of departing from the attitude which has been officially termed 'the policy of good neighbors'."(45)
The Toronto Globe headlined its report, "U.S. Disavows Airport Yarn," even though it confirmed for its readers that the appropriations bill would be passed and the air bases built (46). The New York Times quoted one Canadian editorial as saying that it was all "foolish publicity given to an irritating topic" and quoted another that "Canadians by and large did not take the episode seriously and were inclined rather to laugh heartily at the absurdity of the whole affair" (47).
The House approved the air base bill on June 6, 1935 (48), and shortly afterwards there appeared reports that the U.S. War Department was examining the prospect of building a new air base in the Lake Champlain region, directly south of Montreal (49) . When the Canadian government was questioned about this in Parliament, the response was that U.S. air bases are a U.S. domestic affair (50). Given the certified veracity of the sources of information that the U.S. was engaged in hostile preparations, given the continuing evidence of military preparations along the border, it is indeed difficult to interpret the Canadian response as anything other than blind-eye behavior based on an unwillingness to disrupt orthodox beliefs in American goodwill.
Further evidence of Canadian blind-eye behavior at this time comes from the first bi-national "Conference on Canadian-American Affairs" held June 17 to 22, 1935, at Canton, N.Y. and sponsored by St.Lawrence University, Queen's University, and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. The two guests of honour were Elihu Root and Sir Robert Borden. Root had been U.S. Secretary of War when Theodore Roosevelt threatened to use armed force to settle the Alaska boundary dispute, and it was Root who created the War College and the Joint Board and directed them to make war plans, seen so recently in the news. Borden had made a career of anti-Americanism and was Canada's champion opponent of free trade with the U.S. Given the topic of the conference, its location near the border, its guests of honour, and most importantly, its staging right after these widely published accounts of U.S. military preparations against Canada, the most dramatic event of the conference was the complete absence of any comment or query about the border air bases, not in the published proceedings of the conference and not in archived records of the meetings (51). There were 145 participants, most of them professors, diplomats, and businessmen, most of them certainly aware of the air base testimony, and not one of them ready to raise the matter for discussion or inquiry. That is avoidance.
Fifty days later, fifty miles from the conference site, the United States held the largest peace-time military manoeuvres in its history, near the border south of Ottawa, at Pine Camp, the same site as the 1908 and 1910 anti-Canada manoeuvres (52). As an historical phenomenon, these manoeuvres have been examined only in my own book, Bordering on Aggression (53). Five divisions, 36,000 troops, were rushed to the border, some coming in a fleet of New York City taxi cabs that had raced across the state to pick up soldiers in Buffalo. Another 15,000 troops were called to a site in Pennsylvania as a back-up reserve force for those at the border (54). The war game script called for a Blue motorized invasion "across a feigned international boundary defended by a red army", with the Red defenders pushing the invading Blue forces back, until Blue reinforcements arrive and Red loses "out-numbered and out-gunned," this according to the Army's souvenir pamphlet (55). As in 1915, the U.S. military presumed that it was the aggressor and Canada the defender. After these manoeuvres, the War Department purchased enough land to double the size of Pine Camp (56).
U.S. military preparations on the Canadian border, well publicized, were there to be seen. But evidently, they could not be seen, not by Canadians. If the newspaper in Kingston, the nearest Canadian city to these activities, is a fair indication of Canadian concern, then there was no concern at the time. In retrospect, there has, of course, also been no concern, since the very visible alliance and shared victory during WWII served to reinforce perceptions that the U.S. has been, is, and always would be the "trusted ally", the "good neighbor" sharing with Canada "the undefended border". Retrospective judgements of U.S. military preparations in the 1930s would see them as preparations for war with Germany. Such beliefs, however, do not fit with two historical facts: 1) in the 1930s, the U.S. had done "little or no work on Army Plan BLACK for war with Germany;" and 2) as late as 1939, the U.S. Army and Navy War Colleges continued working on the plans for Overseas Expeditionary Force to Capture Halifax from Red-Crimson Coalition (57). Nevertheless, the belief in a bond of perpetual goodwill and partnership between Canada and the U.S. was so set by WWII that it would be well into the Cold War before there would be sufficient discrepancies between beliefs and observations for some Canadians to have new opportunities for doubt and disbelief.
The 1935 air base incident, the 1935 manoeuvres, and the 1935 border base expansion were unseen hints that the U.S. had an active plan for war with Canada. In fact, during the 1920s, as well documented by Preston, the U.S. military developed extensive and detailed planning for the invasion and conquest of Canada. A 1924 draft stated:
"Blue [U.S.] intentions are to hold in perpetuity all Crimson [Canadian] and Red [British] territories gained. The policy will be to prepare the provinces and territories of Crimson and Red to become states and territories of the Blue Union upon the declaration of peace. The Dominion government will be abolished..." (58)
A final draft of these plans was approved by the U.S. Secretaries of War and Navy on May 10, 1930. War Plan RED was ostensibly for war with Great Britain and indeed does have an extended discussion comparing British and U.S. naval capabilities. However, the military operations, especially for the U.S. Army, are very focused on the conquest of Canada. In the 94 page, single-spaced, legal-size text, only one British city is once mentioned, Portsmouth. But every Canadian province and every major Canadian city is present in the text, even communities as small as Sherbrooke, Farnham, Prince Rupert, Trenton, Trois-Riviere, Moosejaw, and Sioux Lookout (59). The Theatre of Operations for the U.S. Army in War Plan RED was defined to be "All CRIMSON territory, " and the Army's mission, in bold type, was "ULTIMATELY, TO GAIN COMPLETE CONTROL OF CRIMSON" (60). Curiously, the word "Canada" is never actually used in the document. Possibly the avoidance of the name "Canada" facilitates war planning by preventing perceptions of the target nation as a friendly, trusting personality.
The U.S. invasion plan had two main thrusts: 1) foreclose opportunities for Britain to send reinforcements to Canada, and 2) seize or destroy strategic Canadian resources (61). The first entailed occupying, destroying, or isolating the ports of Halifax, Quebec City, and Montreal, and impeding, if possible, alternate sea and air transport to Canada via Churchill and other Hudson Bay ports. The second entailed the seizure of the Niagara Falls hydroelectric generators, the Great Lakes canals, the Sudbury nickel works, and the railroad juncture at Winnipeg.
War Plan RED was not a document in a drawer. In 1934, amendments to the plan were approved by the Secretary of War and Secretary of Navy authorizing the destruction of Halifax, Montreal, and Quebec City by "Immediate air operations on as large a scale as practicable" (62) and authorizing the immediate first-use of poison gas against Canadians in order to "increase our advantages and hasten the successful ending of the war" (63). For reasons still unknown, preparations for war with Canada accelerated dramatically in 1935. Perhaps this was a consequence of a Command Post Exercise (CPX) at Fort Dix in September 1934 (64). In any case, when listed in chronological order, the amount of activity in 1935, especially directed towards Canada, is difficult not to notice:
This listing raises a number of historical questions. For example, were the activities of the President, the Army, and the State Department coordinated or independent? Where these events registering in the Canadian government or military, and to what effect? More specifically, did Canadian Prime Minister King feel at all pressured by this military activity during his negotiations of the 1935 free trade accord, or in subsequent acceptance of the Ogdensburg agreement placing Canadian defence under U.S. jurisdiction? Or, might Roosevelt and King have been using trade and defence agreements as a means of reining in U.S. military planning? Was this military activity related to the transfer of Chief of Staff Douglas MacArthur to the Philippines in 1935? What is the history of U.S. intelligence activity during the 1930s? More specifically, what was the extent and nature of U.S. espionage in Canada prior to WWII? Of course, such questions cannot be answered until they are raised, and they cannot be raised until the phenomena at issue can be seen. Sight precedes insight.
In its day, War Plan RED was "among the most sensitive and closely held papers on earth", to quote from a former deputy undersecretary of the U.S. Army (91). Thus, it was not possible for Canadians to have had any reactions to it in the 1930s. War Plan RED was declassified in February, 1974, and this was reported in the summer issue of the Canadian Defence Quarterly by Richard Preston, then an historian at Canada's Royal Military College (92). This first notice of War Plan RED has never been cited in the Social Science Citation Index. Here we have the only known, detailed, strategic plan to conquer Canada, officially authorized at the Cabinet level, by the only nation capable of conquering Canada, and even Canada's Royal Military College was uninterested: the RMC library did not have a copy of War Plan RED until the author donated his own microfilm copy in 1991. It seems that Canadians, even those in the business of thinking about these things, find them unthinkable.
In 1975, War Plan RED was re-discovered and publicized in a Reuters news-wire story by Graham Lovell, writing from Washington, DC. The report was featured by the Montreal Star (93) and carried in abridged forms by the Montreal Gazette (94), the Globe and Mail (95), the Edmonton Journal Weekender (96), the St.John Telegraph-Journal (97), and the St.John's Evening Telegraph (98). Canadian newspapers not reporting the existence of War Plan RED included the Ottawa Citizen, the Toronto Star, the Regina Leader-Post, the Kingston Whig-Standard, and the Charlottetown Guardian, not on Dec. 6 and not in the following issues. The French-language La Presse in Montreal and Le Droit in Ottawa did not report it. The Vancouver Sun, the Winnipeg Free Press, and the Halifax Chronicle-Herald, all from cities named as invasion targets in the Reuters report and shown dramatically on an accompanying invasion map, did not carry the report or even acknowledge its coverage elsewhere. On the U.S. side, the New York Times and the Washington Post did not allow their readers to know about the U.S. invasion plans. Thus, avoidance was the typical journalistic response to War Plan RED.
In any case, the news-wire story and subsequent abridgments quite misrepresented War Plan RED by linking it to the start of the Great Depression in 1929 and by emphasizing U.S. defensiveness, for example, that Canada "was to be invaded by the United States as a defensive measure"(99). However, according to the Reuter's report, this was to have been a very offensive defence:
"State Department and Pentagon officials emphasized that the plans were purely defensive --except for what one termed 'that pre-emptive foray into Canada to protect ourselves'."
This, even though the "war planners thought that Canada would be neutral". The report also mentioned a memorandum "suggesting that an officer be sent on a secret mission to the Hudson Bay area" to look for hidden Canadian air bases. The report lined up comments from several U.S. military officers that this would have been a silly waste of time and suggested that the whole scheme was something cooked up by Charles Lindbergh. But despite the news report's readiness to find the idea ridiculous, archived documents show that the mission had in fact been ordered (100).
In 1977, two years after the news-wire report, Richard Preston published The Defence of the Undefended Border, again bringing U.S. war planning to public awareness, this time set in historical context with five decades of U.S. military espionage and invasion planning. Though discovering evidence of continuous U.S. military designs against Canada from 1867 to 1939, and finding no comparable planning on the Canadian side, Preston is very much an apologist. As an historian, he displays his discoveries, but as a member of a military institution, he seems embarrassed by the implications of those discoveries. Thus, Preston presents excuses for U.S. actions where possible and often looks away from concrete logistical or political extensions of U.S. invasion planning. The book sold approximately 800 copies and is now out of print. In its first decade, it appeared in the Social Sciences Citation Index only four times.
The first citation was 1978, when A.E. Campbell reviewed the book and dismissed its findings as unimportant because military staff "must have something to do" and they "therefore prepare for any eventuality they can foresee, probable or improbable" (101). Campbell wrote this despite the fact that War Plan RED was a policy document approved at the Cabinet level and despite the fact that the U.S. military had not prepared plans for all contingencies. For example, in the 1930s, the U.S. has no plans for war with its last two battlefield enemies, Spain and Germany, nor with Italy, even though all three nations were increasingly in the news for their military activity and fascism.
In 1978, Desmond Morton presented another dismissive review of Preston's book, repeating the unsubstantiated surmise that the plans were only idle activity "for underemployed staff officers" and "represented the efforts of peacetime armed forces to find meaning for their existence" (102). Such arguments overlook Cabinet-level authorization for the use of poison gas against Canadians, overlook base construction and large scale manoeuvres, overlook active espionage in Canada. Morton also surmised that the U.S. military did not take itself seriously and probably thought it "more discreet to plan for war with friends rather than with potential enemies."
Finally, Morton made his beliefs clear by declaring that Canada's 1920s Defence Plan No. 1, designed to forestall a U.S. invasion, was "proof of the chronic absurdity of the military mind." The false inference here is that if a Canadian conquest of the U.S. is absurd, then so is a U.S. conquest of Canada. But these nations did not have comparable military capabilities, nor had they comparable war plans. Canada planned a retreat in order to buy time, but gave no funds to buy equipment or training for that plan. The U.S. planned an extended military occupation of Canada, coast-to-coast, and in 1935 alone funded that with tens of millions of dollars for base expansions, new air fields, and massive military manoeuvres. In a U.S. military history journal, a retired U.S. deputy undersecretary of the Army compared the two war plans and concluded that Col. Sutherland Brown's plan for a quick Canadian strike into the United States within four days of a declaration of war, followed by a destructive retreat, might have worked:
"Fanciful, maybe, given the relative strengths of the two combatants. But who is to say that the desperate dash of Buster Brown's 'Flying Columns' in all-out defense of their homeland would not have bought the precious days necessary for British reinforcements to reach the scene --especially since the authors of Joint Plan Red seem not to have envisaged such aggressive action by the Canadians."(103)
N.F. Dreisziger's 1979 review of Preston's book was another that tried to dismiss historical facts that did not fit orthodox beliefs (104). Again, there is the false argument that "American planning for the invasion of Canada was mostly an academic exercise", some unimportant little activity from "the childhood days" of war planning. Again, Dreisziger states that it was the very friendship between the U.S. and Canada that caused the U.S. military to plan for war on Canada. He apparently was willing to write this conclusion into history, without mentioning the poison gas authorization, without mentioning the amendment to destroy Halifax, Montreal and Quebec City by strategic bombing, without mentioning the section of War Plan RED which reads:
"...large parts of CRIMSON territory will become theaters of military operations with consequent suffering to the population and widespread destruction and devastation of the country..."(105)
This is not very friendly and certainly not consistent with the usual image of a "good neighbor".
Dreisziger was explicitly worried that Preston's book about U.S. preparations for war on Canada might lead people to question their beliefs about the United States' attitude towards Canada, as would be reasonable whenever new information becomes available:
"It is a well-crafted piece of scholarship researched with great thoroughness. Nevertheless, its publication in an age of anti-American feelings might have undesirable consequences. The book might be misconstrued, or passages might be taken from it out of context and used to bolster the myth that Uncle Sam has, and has always had, designs on Canada."
Dreisziger's rhetoric here is worth examining: "myth" is used to derogate hypotheses without providing the necessary historical evidence that they are unfounded, and "Uncle Sam" is used to further derogate hypotheses by posing them as cartoons. Personifying the United States also invokes all of the psychology of person perception, including unified and consistent personality, even though there is no reason to dismiss U.S. military behavior because it is inconsistent with U.S. public opinion or with the pronouncements of some U.S. politicians.
In 1980, R.W. Winks from Yale University prepared a brief review of Preston's book for a military journal, complimenting the research as well done (106). And that is the extent of indexed citations of Preston's book for its first decade. Not much considering the high compliments it received for its scholarship. One might say that Preston's work has been ignored.
War Plan RED and Defence of the Undefended Border have also been discussed, or avoided, in monographs which do not enter the Citation Index. A sample of books from the FC 240s Library of Congress section shows dismissal to dominate. For example, Charles Stacey, in his 1981 book, Canada and the Age of Conflict, begins his comments with:
"This is a good point at which to mention a matter that has lately received more attention than it deserves: the obscure existence on both sides of the border of 'war plans' implying the possibility of hostilities between the United States and Canada."(107)
The use of "obscure" and the use of quotation marks around "war plans" are both rhetorical devices to dismiss without evidence. Also, the false arguments are again raised that such war plans were idle officers' theoretical exercises, and that plans were made for all contingencies. In line with this dismissive reasoning, Stacey presents an incorrect supposition as an historical fact when he writes: "Up to twenty 'colour' plans existed for war with various countries". Although colour codes may have been defined for that many countries, the records of the Joint Board show approval only of plans for war in Canada, Mexico, the Caribbean, and in the Pacific with Japan.
Stacey wrote that "it is amusing" to read the section of the 1924 draft of War Plan RED declaring that the Canadian government will be abolished and the provinces and territories annexed to the United States. He then wrote into history that "all this activity was highly theoretical" even though he knew about but did not mention the 1935 air base appropriations and could have known about the 1935 manoeuvres-- if historical beliefs had not precluded a search for evidence of concrete military activity. Air bases are concrete. Stacey also wrote into history that all this activity was "almost completely divorced from American national policy" even though he knew but did not mention that the plans had been approved at the Cabinet level and that President Roosevelt had chosen to lie to protect the plans rather than repudiate them or cause them to be canceled.
Stacey concluded his history of U.S. plans for war against Canada by requoting some of Preston's earlier quotation of R.S. Cline, who wrote that "in all cases", except for war with Japan, the color coded plans were "simply outlines of missions", "meaningless", merely "abstract exercises in the technical process of detailed military planning, providing useful training for the officers who drew them up" (108). Thus, three historians --Cline, Preston, and Stacy-- all sing the same song. Add the voices of Campbell, Morton, and Dreisziger, and it becomes hard to hear anything except that it is silly to take these war plans seriously. But these dismissals, in every instance, are empty assertions that popped out without any evidence, or rather, despite evidence to the contrary.
The first of these dismissals was written by Cline in 1951, even though the war plans he was dismissing were not declassified until 1974. Curious. Who was Cline? In 1943, he had been Chief of Current Intelligence for the OSS, and in 1949, joined the CIA to become Chief of the Estimates Staff (109). In 1951, when he published his much requoted claims, he had just become the CIA's liaison officer with British intelligence. After leaving England, he became the CIA's Chief of the Sino-Soviet Area in the Office of Current Intelligence, and in that position was instrumental in obtaining and publishing Kruchchev's 1956 speech (110). He then became the CIA's Chief of Station in Taiwan and after that head of operations in Germany (111). In 1969, he moved to the U.S. State Department as Deputy Director of Intelligence, the first ever to be routinely informed of covert operations (112). Clearly, Cline is not the disinterested scholar Canadians should be quoting and requoting to set a dismissive tone regarding War Plan RED.
But the dismissive tone had been set. Morton, in his 1981 book, Canada and War, continued the chorus, writing that the 1930s invasion plans "were really little more than staff exercises and a framework for war games and militia exercises" (113). No mentions of U.S. invasion plans were made in Gwyn's 1985 book, The 49th Paradox: Canada in North America (114), in Bothwell's 1992 book, Canada and the United States: The Politics of Partnership (115), or in Hollmer and Granatstein' s 1994 book, Empire and Umpire: Canada and the World to the 1990s (116). Thompson and Randall in their 1994 book, Canada and the United States: Ambivalent Allies, quoted the section from the 1924 invasion plan that Stacey had found amusing and then wrote into history, "Not even the soldiers, however, took these plans very seriously" (117). There is no evidence for that claim, but there is abundant evidence that Canadians generally, and Canadian historians especially, have not taken these plans very seriously.
War Plan RED was again re-discovered in 1991 by U.S. journalist Jonathan Salant (118). Demonstrating again that U.S. invasion plans had not entered into Canadian consciousness, at least two Canadian newspapers reported the rediscovery as news (119) . The reactions of two Canadian military officers are also telling. Maj. Don Marsh, speaking for the Ministry of Defence, told the Ottawa Citizen that there is no cause for concern since Canada's relations with the United States "have always been good." Ichheiser would have identified this as a misattribution based on a criterion of consistent disposition. Maj.-Gen.(ret.) Ernie Creber said that such planning "has no meaning unless there are political orders to go ahead with such schemes." To the contrary, the literal meaning is that some agencies of the U.S. government, in some situations, can ready themselves to destroy Canada and kill Canadians. That this is unrealistic, or impossible, given existing beliefs about the United States, means that it is necessary to examine the historical beliefs and the processes by which they are created and maintained.
The conclusion of the history presented thus far is that U.S. behavior hostile to Canada has in large part been ignored. When it has entered historical discourse, it has been disparaged or dismissed with empty assertions, witticisms, and weak arguments. To take U.S. war plans seriously, as the factual historical phenomena they are, does not require a claim that war was imminent, does not require a presumption that all Americans are duplicitous, does not require that alternative explanations be ready. What is required is that the cognitive mechanisms binding historical beliefs, including here both lay and professional beliefs, must be exhumed and examined. If Ichheiser's four mechanisms of misperception discussed earlier are indeed operating, then the beliefs are based on an image of the United States shaped by historically visible, salient events, for example, by the absence of war for almost two centuries, by military alliance, by the easy movement of people, news, and commerce across the border, by repeated pronouncements of "undefended border", "good-neighbor", "permanent peace", "trusted ally" and the like. No matter how much it is wished, none of these conditions and none of this rhetoric stop agencies of the U.S. government, in some situations, from having hostile designs on Canada. Furthermore, there is a tendency to perceive the United States as having a unity of attitude and behavior toward Canada despite the diversity in U.S. populations, politicians, and government agencies, and as having a consistency of attitude and behavior across contexts and historical periods. Historical facts that do not fit these preconditions, are ignored, dismissed, or disparaged. Finally, even though we may know, in principle, that historical beliefs would be better if not biased by processes of misperception, they may, in fact, still be biased by them.
The presumption that the U.S. military planned for all conceivable contingencies routinely leads to the inference that therefore none of the plans was of any consequence. This presumption is wrong, and the inference is false. First, there is simply no evidence in the U.S. military archives that plans were made for all contingencies. To the contrary, there is specific evidence in the archived record that only the most likely wars were studied. As explained by Brig.-Gen.Tasker Bliss, commander of the U.S. War College, to Admiral George Dewey and the Joint Board, concerning the war plans that should be "jointly studied and agreed upon" by the two services "primarily through the agency of their respective War Colleges"(120):
"For the specific purposes for which a General Staff is created, the order of relative importance of the war problems which it must study is determined by the order of their relative probability of occurrence in actual experience. It will have failed in its duty if a little war which occurs tomorrow finds it unprepared although at the same time it has carefully studied the conditions of a great war the probable occurrence of which is in the remoter future. If we were guaranteed ample time for study, the question of probability of occurrence need cause us no delay for consideration. We would take up each possible theatre of war or combination of theatres, study them under all possible conditions, and thus be prepared for any possible emergency. As we have no such guarantee of sufficient time for a universal study, we have to endeavor to lift the veil of the future by the exercise of what Napoleon called 'the power of scientific imagination;' we have to make a scientific guess --that is to say, a legitimate inference based upon known conditions and tendencies-- as to what now seems most likely to happen first and in respect to which we need to be first prepared."(121)
In other words, if the United States had only four approved war plans, and one of them was for the conquest of Canada, then that is what U.S. military staff predicted to be a good prospect.
Two more presumptions that encourage dismissal of U.S. war planning are: 1) that the U.S. War Department was a Defense Department, and 2) that war plans were merely practice unrelated to any policies to actually attack a neighbor. Again, the archived evidence is contrary to these beliefs. Brig.-Gen. Bliss, in the same document, explained that U.S. wars would likely be aggression masked as defence:
"I do not think that when the United States comes to fight it will be for the declared purpose of extension of trade, although that may be the real cause of war and its real object, concealed under an appeal to the Monroe Doctrine."(122)
After pages of reasoning and inference, Bliss identified Mexico as a country that could be attacked without risk of confronting a major power:
"That the intervention of the United States in Mexico may become necessary, with the least chance of any other foreign complication connected therewith."(123)
Bliss recommended that the U.S. prepare for five contingencies, the fifth of these was for intervention in Mexico (124).
Here is one example of a so-called "abstract, theoretical exercise" written by a purported "idle officer." But, contrary to the standard song, the exercise would eventually become national policy approved at the very highest political level, would develop into concrete operational plans, and would in fact cause a neighbor to suffer a U.S. invasion. The following information has been available from the U.S. National Archives since 1956 in the same set of microfilm as War Plan RED. It could easily have been found by any historians seeking evidence for and against their beliefs that U.S. war plans were benign. On April 15, 1912, a Joint Board plan for military intervention in Mexico was approved by the Secretary of Navy. On May 3, U.S. President Taft counter-signed the plan (125). An amended version specifically recommending the "Seizure and temporary occupancy of Vera Cruz and Tampico by the naval forces of the United States" was approved on February 13, 1913, by Acting Secretary of the Navy Winthrop, with counter-signature by President Taft (126).
One year later, in April 1914, as per the plan, U.S. naval forces seized and occupied first Tampico and then Vera Cruz. Dead in the streets were 126 Mexicans, and the standard encyclopaedia and textbook versions of these events would have us believe 1) that the Tampico invasion was a response to the failure of Mexican federal forces to apologize sufficiently for detaining some U.S. Marines who had landed in Tampico without permission, and 2) that the invasion of Vera Cruz was to prevent a German ship violating the Monroe Doctrine by delivering military supplies purchased by the Mexican government (127). These explanations are lame and shameful. The invasions had been pre-planned and pre-authorized. The invocation of the Monroe Doctrine was a prepared lie: the munitions carried by the German ship had been loaded in New York City (128). There seems to have been no rationale for these invasions other than the mere momentum of military planning: certainly no additional apologies were forthcoming from the Mexicans, the German ship did deliver its cargo, and the Americans did withdraw.
This planning has been invisible, unseen and unheard in history. Nevertheless, this example makes it clear that U.S. military planning for war against its neighbors is not merely defensive and not purely theoretical. It should be noted that the fourth of Brig.-Gen. Bliss's proposed war plans was "a study of the Canadian frontier, assume England as an intervening power under assumption a) alone, b) in coalition" (129). Given the additional evidence compiled by Preston, the origin of War Plan RED should be credited to Bliss in 1905, quite unrelated to the 1929 onset of the Great Depression or to the 1932 rise of Nazi militarism in Germany.
History does not stop, nor have signs of unfriendly behavior by agencies of the U.S. government. And Canadians continue to look way. For example, from 1956 to 1980, almost every U.S. ambassador to Canada had a background in espionage, and apparently no one has noticed. These are all very high profile men, worthy of routine curiosity about their biographies. Information about their espionage activities has been readily available in standard reference sources, such as the State Department's Biographic Register, and in books of contemporary history. But no one can think to look for what is unthinkable. Mike Frost, a professional Canadian espionage officer and author of Spyworld, when told first-hand by CIA staff that some U.S. ambassadors are espionage agents, said that he "tried to hide his astonishment at finding out the CIA actually had American ambassadors trained as spies" (132). If a Canadian spy could not believe it, then how much more disbelieving must ordinary citizens be.
From 1956 to 1958, and again from 1961 to 1962, Livingston T. Merchant was U.S. Ambassador to Canada. A Princeton University graduate, Merchant worked in finance before joining the State Department (133). In 1948, he was posted to Nanking, China, then in the midst of a communist revolution opposed by U.S. military and espionage operations (134). In 1950, he was the State Department's liaison to the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC), a covert operations unit comprised of former OSS operatives (135). In that role, he was instrumental in the United State's first covert counter-insurgency operation, which was in the Philippines. While Ambassador to Canada, Merchant participated in the U.S. campaign against Prime Minister Diefenbaker, which included subversion of Royal Canadian Air Force officers and manipulation of the Canadian press corps (136). In 1965, Merchant co-authored a report on U.S.-Canada relations that recommended that difficulties and disputes between the two nations be kept from public knowledge (137). However, Peter Newman's popular history of this period, Renegade in Power: The Diefenbaker Years, presents Merchant as the ideal image of the reasonable, patient, polite, professional diplomat (138).
In 1962, Willis C. Armstrong was interim Charge d'Affairs for the U.S. in Ottawa. He quite frankly told Jean-François Lisée that he had been an advisor to the CIA (139). He also told Lisée that as head of the Canada Desk in Washington from 1962 to 1964, he was responsible for naming diplomatic staff in Canada, and that he "always made sure to have talented, competent senior officers" in Montreal and Quebec City (140). At least 6 U.S. diplomats in these two cities during Armstrong's tenure have been identified by the State Department's Biographic Register as well as by Who's Who in CIA to be trained intelligence agents (141):
None of these undercover agents were identified as such by Lisée in his account of U.S. espionage in Quebec. To the contrary, Lisée stated quite confidently that there is no record of there ever being U.S. espionage operations in Quebec (142). Former CIA assistant director Victor Marchetti told Lisée that he had heard mention of "the Montreal base" and said that any operations in Canada would have been done outside usual CIA command structure, without the usual authorizations, but Lisée dismissed that as unbelievable because it "requires a considerable leap of faith" (143). In other words, presumption prevents evidence. Blind-eye history obeys prior beliefs.
After discussing how George Jaeger, U.S. consul general in Quebec City, arranged to receive secret Cabinet documents via Jacques Parizeau's Ministry of Finance, Lisée wrote:
"With such quantity and quality of information, it was understandable that Washington had no need for CIA agents in Quebec."(144)
In fact, Austrian-born Jaeger began working for the U.S. Counter-Intelligence Corps in 1944, was listed in Who's Who in CIA in 1968, and is identified by his State Department biography to be a career intelligence officer (145).
From 1962 to 1968, William W. Butterworth was U.S. Ambassador to Canada. Also a Princeton graduate, he first was posted to Canada as a junior diplomat in 1932 (146). In 1941, he attended the fourth and last bi-annual "Conference on Canadian-American Relations", coming to Queen's University as Chief of the British Empire Unit of the U.S. Department of Commerce (147). With him at the conference were two other men with prominent careers in U.S. espionage: 1) Calvin B. Hoover, who, by his own account, began intelligence work for the U.S. government in 1933, and 2) William P. Maddox, a Princeton University professor who became an OSS colonel in charge of intelligence operations in London (148). Butterworth served during WWII as an economic warfare specialist in Spain and Portugal and became one of two OSS contacts with Germany's chief of military intelligence, Walter Schellenberg (149). The other contact was Allen Dulles, eventually to become head of the CIA. After the war, along with Merchant, Butterworth was posted to Nanking (150). As U.S. Ambassador to Canada, Butterworth continued the campaign to destabilize the Diefenbaker government, and at the initial urging of Willis Armstrong, drafted the press release that contradicted the Prime Minister and caused the fall of his government (151).
From 1969 to 1973, Adolph W. Schmidt was U.S. Ambassador to Canada. He was from the powerful Pittsburgh Mellon family and was another Princeton graduate (152). During WWII, Schmidt worked for the OSS in Cairo and London, and in 1945, along with Richard Helms, he took over management of OSS operations in occupied Germany when William Casey had to leave for covert operations in China (153). When Schmidt became Ambassador to Canada, he brought with him to Ottawa, as his principle political advisor, Vladimir Toumanoff, another career U.S. intelligence agent (154). During the Schmidt-Toumanoff tenure in Ottawa, Quebec separatism was re-invigorated by the 1970 October Crisis and by the development of the Parti Québecois.
From 1974 to 1976, William J. Porter was U.S. Ambassador to Canada. During WWII, he held various State Department postings in the Middle East, including Baghdad, Beirut, and Damascus (155), all cities of intensive espionage activity (156). Porter was posted to Algeria from 1961 to 1965, first as consul general and then as ambassador. His U.S. AID director there was Donald Q. Coster, a career intelligence agent himself also with a record of activity in Canada (157). On April 22, 1961, four French generals staged a military coup, apparently supported by the CIA (158). In 1965, Porter went to Vietnam as the single-manager of the U.S. pacification program, commanding USAID and CIA resources in order to win the hearts and minds of the Vietnamese peasants (159). In 1971, he became Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs and was instrumental in backing the Lon Nol coup in Cambodia (160).
From 1976 to 1979, Thomas O. Enders was U.S. Ambassador to Canada. He was first employed by the State Department in 1958 as an "intelligence research specialist" (161). After various positions in Eastern Europe, he became Deputy Chief of Mission in Cambodia, where he was responsible for using a local intelligence network to select which villages would be bombed in President Nixon's secret war (162). Said one colleague, "He was not burdened by much interest in Cambodians." Enders' next assignment was in Canada, where he is most remembered for his relentless campaign for free trade (163). After that, President Reagan appointed him Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs. His tenure included the invasion of Grenada and the U.S. proxy wars in Nicaragua and El Salvador. Enders was part of an élite inter-agency group that coordinated the war against Nicaragua; others were Lt.-Col. Oliver North, U.S. Army Gen. Paul Gorman, and Duane Clarridge, head of the CIA's covert operations in Latin America (164). Lisée quoted René Lévesque's belief that Enders "is a damned spy --he must be working for the CIA," but Lisée dismissed this as mere speculation arising from "the absence of hard information on American activities in Quebec" (165).
It is not at all clear what should be made of this record of ambassadors with espionage backgrounds. It is certainly not consistent with "good neighbor" beliefs. Journalists and historians could have discovered and reported these backgrounds at the time of tenure of each ambassador, and explanations could have been sought and explanations given. But even in retrospect, it is important to examine the backgrounds of U.S. diplomats if Canadians are to ever understand their modern history, if they are ever to have historical beliefs that allow them to freely observe, seek, and evaluate reported incidents of hostile U.S. behavior in contemporary history. These are too numerous to dismiss from history sight unseen.
Reports of various U.S. agencies engaging in what appears to be surreptitious and hostile activity have yet to be adequately examined and explained. For example, there is evidence over the past three decades that U.S. agencies have been covertly manipulating Canadian elections (166), have infiltrated federal political parties (167), have targeted Canadian politicians and institutions for electronic surveillance (168), and have engaged in economic espionage in Canada (169). During the 1960s, the CIA directed funding to Canadian student associations (170), the officers of which may have subsequently moved into positions of political influence in Canada. U.S. intelligence officers and politicians have advised and assisted the Parti Québecois ( 171) and perhaps even infiltrated and helped fund the FLQ (172). In 1962, the U.S. Army's Special Operations Research Office initiated "Task Revolt" in Quebec (173), well before FLQ terrorism, well before "Operation Camelot", but surprisingly soon after the CIA's 1961 National Intelligence Estimate predicted "an improved relationship between the major English- and French-speaking communities" (174). There has been one report from a BBC documentary that the CIA, in 1967, had a training base in Quebec near Trois-Riviere (175). There is also the long standing claim that the CIA, prior to the 1970 October Crisis, moved considerable manpower into Montreal (176). In the mid-1980s, the United States built a new Army base on the Canadian border, near Ottawa and not far from Montreal (177). The rapid assault division garrisoned at Fort Drum specializes in urban warfare, winter combat, and surprise attacks. Finally, a comparison of Canada's Diplomatic Corps directory with espionage data bases shows that hundreds of U.S. intelligence agents have been posted to Canada under diplomatic cover between 1945 and 1994 (178).
Of course, not all such reports are accurate, and a first step in trying to understand the causes and consequences of hostile behavior by agencies of the United States is to seek further empirical evidence to confirm or disconfirm these reports. For example, in 1971, the Kingston Whig-Standard reprinted an interview with a Mr. Henry Gablinger by a journalist named John Samson. It had been originally published in a U.S. newspaper called the Examiner (179). Mr. Gablinger was described as an expert on natural resources and an advisor to President Richard Nixon. Gablinger stated forthrightly that the U.S. will take Canadian energy and water resources by treaty or by force: "its all very simple," and "just look at the figures," and "we have the means to conquer Canada" (180). Richard Preston wanted a quick dismissal of this report and felt that he had it on the grounds that "no such American periodical had ever existed" (181). In fact, there are numerous U.S. papers called Examiner; the most famous one is found in San Francisco (182). Preston's conclusion was right but not for the right reasons: a) there is no record anywhere of a Henry Gablinger resources expert or advisor to Richard Nixon, and b) the only U.S. journalist named John Samson was then editor of a sports magazine and only wrote under the pen-name Jack Samson (183). He has denied authorship. Although there is still the question of who did write it and why, the document is not authentic and can be dismissed, but on the basis of a systematic search for evidence, not on the basis of a cognitive need to turn a blind eye.
In the introduction to this paper, William James was cited for his psychology of beliefs and their conservative inertia. He was writing in the context of explaining pragmatism, a philosophy which weighs the merits of competing beliefs by asking, "What differences would they make?" Canada is a fragile country, despite its size and apparent wealth. Like the Dutch relentlessly repairing their dikes, Canadians must relentlessly repair their national political structure. Canada is not robust. When Canadians refuse to examine evidence of U.S. hostile actions, then they needlessly imperil the nation. That is a difference that weighs against hand-me-down history and quick dismissals of facts. That is a difference that favours doubt and favours a history that is conscious of its cognitive faults.
1. For example, the following three discussions on the relationship between history and the social sciences have little of note on the psychology of history:
M.M. Krug, History and the Social Sciences (Toronto 1967).
D. Heater, "History and the Social Sciences", in M. Ballard (ed.), New Movements in the Study and Teaching of History (Bloomington, Indiana, 1970), pp. 134-146.
W.M. Runyan, "Reconceptualizing the Relationship Between History and Psychology," in W.M. Runyan (ed.), Psychology and Historical Interpretation (Oxford 1988), pp. 247-285.
G.E.R. Lloyd, Demystyfying Mentalities (Cambridge 1989).
J. Fentress and C. Wickman, Social Memory (Cambridge, Mass., 1992).
Articulation of Memory, a symposium of articles in Oceania, 66 (Jun 1996), pp. 257-327.
Memory and American History, a symposium of articles in The Journal of American History, 75 (Mar 1989).
L. de Mause, A Bibliography of Psychohistory (New York 1975).
E.H. Erikson, New Directions in Psychohistory (Lexington, MA, 1980).
E. Stannard, Shrinking History: On Freud and the Failure of Psychohistory (Oxford 1980).
D.K. Simonton, Psychology, Science, and History: An Introduction to Historiometry (New Haven, CT, 1990).
Anon., Encyclopedia Britannica, Vol. 19 (Chicago 1991), p. 179.
F.W. Rudmin, "Cognitive History of the Bosnian Civil War: A Review of Interview Data," presented at 60th Anniversary Convention of the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues (Ann Arbor, May, 1996).
N.M. Horrock, "A Land Where History Holds Them by the Throat," Toronto Star, 27 May 1993, p. A17.
P. Koring, "Painful Memories Drive Serb General," Globe and Mail, 28 Jun 1993, p. A9.
13. "Person perception" and such related topics as "social cognition", "attribution", and "implicit personality theory" are common topics in most social psychology text books. Further discussion can be found in the following sources:
14. F. Rudmin, M. Trimpop, I.-P. Kryl, and P. Boski, "Gustav Ichheiser in the History of Social Psychology: An Early Phenomenology of Social Attribution," British Journal of Social Psychology, 26 (1987), pp. 165-180.
G. Ichheiser, "Misunderstandings in Human Relations: A Study of False Social Perception," American Journal of Sociology, 55, (Supplement Part 2, 1949).
G. Ichheiser, Appearances and Realities (San Francisco 1970).
W.F. Brewer and G.V. Nakamura, "The Nature and Function of Schemas," in R.W. Wyer, Jr. and T.K. Srull (eds.), Handbook of Social Cognition, Vol. 1 (London 1984), pp. 119-160.
D.E. Rumelhart, "Schemata and the Cognitive System," in R.W. Wyer, Jr. and T.K. Srull (eds.), Handbook of Social Cognition, Vol. 1 (London 1984), pp. 161-189.
R. Hastie, "Memory for Behavioral Information that Confirms or Contradicts a Personality Impression," in R. Hastie, T.M. Ostrom, E.B. Ebbesen, R.S. Wyer, Jr., D.L. Hamilton, and D.E. Carlston (eds.), Person Memory: The Cogntive Basis of Social Perception (Hillsdale, NJ, 1980), pp. 155-177.
Anon., "War Puzzle Solved Too Soon", The Sun (New York), 5 Aug 1910, p.5.
Anon., "Canadian Army is Crushed", The Sun (New York), 9 Aug 1910, p. 3.
Anon., "Oppose Pine Plains as Manoeuvre Site," New York Times, 27 Jul 1908, p. 3.
Anon., "Oliver Strongly Urges the Site," Watertown Daily Times, 5 Feb 1909, p. 4.
Anon., "Recruits Defeat the Red Invasion: Blue Army Wins Battle of Fort Montgomery on the Canadian Border," New York Times, 31 Aug 1915, p. 4.
Anon., "Brigade on 'Hike'," Plattsburgh Daily Press, 28 Aug 1915, p. 3.
Anon., "With Blue and Red," Plattsburgh Daily Press, 30 Aug 1915, p. 3.
40. Air Defense Bases: Hearings Before the Committee on Military Affairs, House of Representatives, Seventy-Fourth Congress, First Session, on H.R. 6621 and H.R. 4130, February 11, 12, 13, 1935, (Washington, DC, 1935), p. 61.
Anon., "M'Swain Explains Canada Incident," New York Times, 2 May 1935, p. 11.
Anon., "Roosevelt Scores House Committee on Border Air Base," New York Times, 1 May 1935, pp. 1-2.
Anon., "Gets Army Promotion," New York Times, 24 Jul 1935, p. 3.
Trotter files, Queen's University Archives, Kingston, Ontario.
H.W. Baldwin, "Army is Massed in Two-Day Rush: Men and Machines of War Pour into Pine Camp by Train, Truck and Taxi," New York Times, 19 Aug 1935, pp. 1, 3.
H.W. Baldwin, "Motorized Attack Opens Modern 'War'," New York Times, 22 Aug 1935, pp. 1, 3.
J.H. Brior, "Reds Drive Back New Englanders," Watertown Daily Times, 22 Aug 1935, p. 1.
Ibid., p. 85 (amended draft).
D. Gibbs, The Political Economy of Third World Interventions (Chicago 1991), pp. 118-119, 134-135, 140.
A. Taheri, Nest of Spies: America's Journey to Disaster in Tehran (New York 1988), p. 71.
U.S. State Dept., Biographic Register (Washington, DC, 1944), p. 136.
U.S. State Dept., Biographic Register (Washington, DC, 1967), p. 347.p>
W. Shawcross, Side-Show: Kissinger, Nixon and the Destruction of Cambodia (New York 1979), pp. 53-54.
U.S. State Dept., Biographic Register (Washington, DC, 1944), p. 209.
U.S. State Dept., Biographic Register (Washington, DC, 1944), p. 152.
U.S. State Dept., Biographic Register (Washington, DC, 1967), p. 392.
L. Martin, The Presidents and Prime Ministers. Washington and Ottawa Face to Face: The Myth of Bilateral Bliss (Toronto 1982).
88. C.H. Jones and R.W. Crawford, "Critical Areas of Canada and Approaches Thereto," in Current Estimate of Canada and New Foundland, pp. 40-59, available in U.S. National Archives, RG 165, Army War College, Vol. II, Part 2, Doc. 19, Supplement No. 3, Box 41, 15W3/15/4C.
D.Q. Coster, "Behind the German Lines," Readers Digest 37 (Nov), pp. 115-125.
J. Mader, Who's Who in CIA (Berlin 1968), p. 114.
U.S. State Dept., Biographic Register (Washington, DC, 1944).
Who's Who in America (Chicago 1976), p. 665.
Preston, ibid., p. 219.
U.S. State Department, Biographic Register (Washington, DC, 1973), p. 68.
Who's Who in America (Chicago 1985), p. 606.
J. Ranelagh, The Agency: The Rise and Decline of the CIA (London 1986), pp. 196, 286-287.
D. Wise and T.B. Ross, The Invisible Government (London 1965), pp. 234-235.
Wise and Ross, ibid., p. 238.
D. Pugliese, "Invasion 1930: US Had a Plan to Attack Canada to Win Economic Battle with Britain," Ottawa Citizen, 27 Mar 1991, pp. A1-A2.
125. Adm. George Dewey, [letter from the Joint Board to the Secretary of Navy] 15 April 1912, approved by the Secretary of Navy on April 22, 1912, and by President Taft on May 3, 1912. Declassified May 22, 1956, and available in the records of the Joint Board, U.S. National Archives in microfilm roll 9, JB 320-325, Serial 415.
126. Adm. George Dewey, [letter from the Joint Board to the Secretary of Navy] 13 February 1913, approved by the Acting Secretary of Navy and by President Taft. Declassified May 22, 1956, and available in the records of the Joint Board, U.S. National Archives in microfilm roll 9, JB 320-325, Serial 415.
W.C. Gordon, "Mexico" in Encyclopedia Britannica, Vol. 15 (Chicago 1971), p. 335.
R. Hofstadter, W. Miller, and D. Aaron, The United States: The History of the Republic (Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1967), p. 641.
R.C. Wade, H.B. Wilder, and L.C. Wade, A History of the United States (New York 1966), p. 601.
W.L. Hayes, Statistics (4th ed.) (Fort Worth 1988), pp.45-47.
K. Nash, Kennedy and Diefenbaker: Fear and Loathing Across the Undefended Border (Toronto 1990), pp. 145-148.
Nash, ibid., pp. 317-318.
U.S. State Department, Biographic Register (Washington, DC, 1967), p. 289.
U.S. State Department, Biographic Register (Washington, DC, 1971), pp. 83, 336, 459, 377-378, 464.
U.S. State Department, Biographic Register (Washington, DC, 1974), p.166.
A.C. Brown, The Secret War Report of the OSS (New York 1976), pp. 6, 303.
Mader, ibid., pp. 242, 326.
U.S. State Dept., Biographic Register (Washington, DC, 1946), p. 320.
Who's Who in America (Chicago 1965), p. 300.
Nash, ibid., pp. 238-241.
W. Casey, The Secret War Against Hitler (New York 1989), p. 218.
U.S. State Dept., Biographic Register (Washington, DC, 1971), p. 424.
Who's Who in America (Chicago 1974), p. 2520.
Dunlop, ibid., p. 344.
R.H. Smith, OSS: The Secret History of America's First Central Intelligence Agency (Berkeley 1972), p. 173.
Who's Who in America (Chicago 1976), p. 665.
R.A. Hunt, Pacification: The American Struggle for Vietnam's Hearts and Minds (Oxford 1995), pp. 71-81.
J. Littleton, Target Nation: Canada and the Western Intelligence Network (Toronto 1986), pp. 82-83.
Martin, ibid., pp. 198-199, 206-207.
G.S. Mount, Canada's Enemies: Spies and Spying in the Peaceable Kingdom (Toronto 1993), pp. 108-109.
Nash, ibid., pp. 166-170, 277-279, 285.
L. Pratt, "More on the CIA: Spooks in God's Country?" Last Post, 5 (Oct. 1975), pp. 9-10.
S.J. Robinson, Hansard, 25 May 1982, pp. 17772-17773.
R. Sheppard, "Ottawa Investigated Claims that RCMP Infiltrated by CIA," Globe and Mail, 20 May 1982, pp. 1-2.
R. Sheppard, "Kaplan May Convene a Closed Probe on CIA," Globe and Mail, 21 May 1982, p. 5.
R. Speirs, "Straight-Talker Protects U.S. Clout in Ottawa," Toronto Star, 14 Nov 1994, p. A10.
Sheppard, 20 May 1982, ibid.
Sheppard, 21 May 1982, ibid.
M. Fornataro, "The Prosecution of John Meier," Canadian Covert Activity Analyst 1 (Fall/Winter 1984), pp. 3, 9-16.
Frost and Gratton, ibid., pp. 153 (facing photos), 270.
Lisée, ibid., p. 320.
Littleton, ibid., pp. 99-100.
D. Sellar, "How Canada Took the Cruise," Vancouver Sun, 10 Mar 1983, p. 5.
Mount, ibid., p. 117.
Who's Who in America (Chicago 1976), p. 665.
Mader, ibid., p. 576.
Mader, ibid., pp. 139, 258-259.
Sheppard, 20 May 1982, ibid.
U.S. State Dept., Biographic Register (Washington, D.C., 1974), p. 166.
Littleton, ibid., p. 147.
R. McKenzie and R. Lebel, "FLQ Men in Cuba Linked to Murder Cell," Toronto Star, 2 Aug 1973, pp. A1, A7.
M. Viorst, "An Analysis of American Intervention in the Matter of Quebec," Macleans (Nov 1972), pp. 22-23, 74-76.
B. Macadam and J.R. Dubro, "How the CIA Has Us Spooked," Macleans, (Jul 1974), p. 46.
I.L. Horowitz, The Rise and Fall of Project Camelot (Cambridge, MA, 1967).
J. Edginton and J. Sergeant, "The Murder of Martin Luther King, Jr.," Covert Action Information Bulletin, no. 34 (summer 1990), pp. 21-27.
T. Hazlitt, "Ex-Spy Claims U.S. Tanks Ready in Quebec Crisis," Toronto Star, 22 Sep 1973, pp. A1, A4.
M. Harrison, "Official Denials are Only to Be Expected," Toronto Star, 29 Sep 1973, p. B2.
Lisée, ibid., pp. 105, 320.
178. F. Rudmin, "A Brief History of Unseen Espionage in Canada", April 1997, unpublished, but available from the author upon request. See page 1. This paper identifies over 200 U.S. personnel who show evidence of intelligence activity and who were present in Canada between 1945 and 1994. Intelligence agents can easily be identified by using the Canadian government's quarterly Diplomatic Corps directory and cross-checking U.S. diplomats' names 1) with the State Department's Biographic Register looking for "intelligence" classifications, military service with the OSS, or such telltale signs as temporary mid-career transfers to U.S. military services, or 2) with espionage data bases, such as NAMEBASE, produced by Public Information Research, PO Box 680635, San Antonio, TX 78268 USA. NAMEBASE is now available on the World Wide Web.
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