Privatization of War: The Question of
Individual Responsibility for Waging Warfare through Mercenarism
Nizkor Int. Human Rights
Team
Derechos Human Rights
Serpaj Europa
Information
03May01
BEHIND THE RECRUITMENT OF MERCENARIES BY PRIVATE SECURITY AND MILITARY
ASSISTANCE COMPANIES THERE IS AN INTEND TO "OUTSOURCE" THE WAR IN A
WAY
THAT IS NOT ACCOUNTABLE.
Excerpts from the 2001 report of the UN Special Rapporteur on Use of
Mercenaries [E/CN.4/2001/19]
(...)
C. CRIMINAL ASSOCIATIONS
59. Generally speaking, mercenarism is a criminal association between
the person writing the contract and the one performing it who, in return
for payment, agrees to participate in an armed conflict or the
commission of a criminal act. The mercenary sells the expertise he has
acquired and undertakes to bring about the damage desired by the person
by whom he has been contracted. Any investigation conducted to
determine whether the act was committed by a mercenary should therefore
make a distinction between these elements as well as others based on
information concerning the recruitment, hiring and training of the
mercenary. Recruitment procedures, paramilitary training organizations,
the use of newspaper advertisements, training centres and covert
operations should all be looked into. The simultaneous use of different
nationalities and passports as well as false identity documents may well
provide information on the mercenary status of the person concerned.
However, determination of actual mercenary status implies an analysis of
the relationship between the mercenary and the person who recruited,
trained and paid him. Generally speaking, indications and clues that
reveal the existence of an unlawful association with intent to engage in
combat or commit offences should be sought.
(...)
D. PRIVATE SECURITY AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMPANIES OPERATING
INTERNATIONALLY.
62. The Special Rapporteur has, in his previous reports, referred to the
recruitment, hiring and use of mercenaries by private companies offering
military security services on the international market. This trend is
of recent origin and some of these companies are involved in armed
conflicts and provide training to combat forces or pilots for troop
transport and offer specialized technical services; on occasion they
participate actively in combat situations.
63. In point of fact the private sector has traditionally contributed to
the development of military science and technology and its contribution
has been particularly useful in the areas of basic and applied research,
technological innovation, development of new strategies and advisory and
project evaluation services. However, what is held against these
companies is that they enter into contracts to recruit, hire and use
mercenaries and become involved in armed conflicts to such an extent
that they supplant the State and its armed security forces.
64. In this respect, it is worth emphasizing what is stated in paragraph
44 of the Special Rapporteur's report to the General Assembly
(A/55/334), namely, that while private companies play an important role
in the area of security, there are certain limits that should not be
exceeded. They should not participate actively in armed conflicts, nor
recruit and hire mercenaries, much less attempt to replace the State in
defending national sovereignty, preserving the right of
self-determination, protecting external borders or maintaining public
order.
65. Similarly, the Special Rapporteur believes that the apparent
connection between an increase in mercenary activity and the well-known
inadequacy of international rules in that area should be examined.
Moreover, the trend towards concealing mercenarism behind modern private
companies could be due to the failure of international law to predict
the new operational modalities for mercenary activities. The system of
international norms must be perfected to counter the development of new
criminal methods. At the same time, greater rigour and precision must
be achieved in concepts and definitions, avoiding generalizations and
ensuring clear legal regulations; private activity in the area of
security and military advice and assistance should be monitored by a
specialized public international institution.
66. Examples can be found on the contemporary international scene of
States debilitated by long-term armed internal conflict and of
Governments that have serious difficulties in ensuring the maintenance
of public order or in guaranteeing the security of their citizens. No
matter how serious the situation they face, these States cannot transfer
their responsibility for public order, security and protection to
private entities. The international community cannot allow either the
formation of private armies or the privatization of war. By definition,
private companies seek the greatest possible profit and their interests
are very different from those of the State. Instead, the international
community should offer support and cooperation to enable States to form
professional armies and security forces trained in both technical areas
and in respect for the rules of international humanitarian law and human
rights.
67. Consequently, clear legal norms are required which specify the areas
in which private military and security companies can legitimately
operate and those in which their intervention should be prohibited.
Such regulations should be established at the national, regional and
international levels. Domestic legislation should take into account the
particular situation of each country and respect the principle of the
free market and free enterprise. It should also respect above all the
principles of State sovereignty, self-determination of peoples and
non-intervention in the internal affairs of States.
68. The Special Rapporteur proposes that the activities of military and
security companies should be regulated, limiting their activities in
this field to areas that are not inherent to the very existence of
States, while not actually prohibiting the existence of such companies.
Any law or regulatory mechanism must prohibit the hiring and formation
of armed units composed of mercenaries.
69. At the same time, and in addition to regulations at the national
level, the international community should attempt to strengthen regional
security mechanisms. Such arrangements are preferable because they are
regulated by clear legal provisions, act in accordance with a
transparent line of command and are fully responsible for any violations
of international humanitarian law or human rights. They are also
familiar with the territory and the peoples where they operate. It is
possible that the interests of private companies, which are motivated
primarily by profit, could run counter to peace and democracy and could
more likely be oriented towards the perpetuation and even escalation of
conflicts.
70. There is therefore no question of prohibiting what the private
company may do in respect of security arrangements but rather of
establishing clear and precise limits for its activities - the most
important point being to prohibit the formation of private armies. The
privatization of war or the establishment of paramilitary groups made up
of mercenaries will only mean leaving civilian populations without
protection and with little or no chance for peace and democracy, hence
opening the way to domination and discrimination.
E. PROBLEMS RAISED BY A LEGAL DEFINITION OF MERCENARISM
71. The Special Rapporteur has repeatedly expressed concern about gaps
in the legal definition of mercenarism and failure to condemn and curb
this crime effectively. Both the Commission and the General Assembly
have expressed and emphasized the same concern and have requested
Governments to submit proposals with a view to arriving at a clearer
legal definition of mercenarism. It is in this context that meetings of
experts are to be held during 2001 in order to study and update the
international legislation in force and to formulate recommendations.
72. States Members in general subscribe to the view that mercenaries are
to be condemned, particularly when they act against the
self-determination of peoples, State sovereignty, peace and political
stability. The communications received by the Special Rapporteur from
various Governments confirm the view that "mercenarism" may be
applicable to serious situations that affect the political stability of
States and, at times, self-determination. The Special Rapporteur
considers it significant that no State has attempted to justify
mercenary activities, in any way in its replies to his communications or
suggested criteria to distinguish between prohibited and permitted
mercenaries or between legal and illegal mercenary activities, depending
on the geopolitical interests at stake. While in the past the so-called
undercover operations of some Powers involved the use of mercenaries, it
would seem that their use is gradually being abandoned in the present
context of globalization.
73. This consensus on the condemnation of mercenary activities of
various kinds is a prime factor to be considered in efforts to update
the legal definition. The Special Rapporteur has noted this same
consensus with regard to the use of mercenaries by private companies
that offer military security on the international market. The view that
their activities should be regulated and monitored does not hold that
such companies should be eliminated, nor that the State should have an
exclusive monopoly in matters of security; it does affirm, however, that
these companies should be prevented from becoming directly involved in
armed conflicts and intervening in them by hiring and forming battalions
of mercenaries to take part in warfare.
74. The currently accepted meaning or use of the term mercenary is
primarily focused on including under this heading professional services
that are paid to recruit soldiers to intervene in an armed conflict in a
country other than their own. The concept thus appears to be linked,
although not exclusively, to participation in armed conflicts and
attacks against the self-determination of peoples. However the use of
this type of professional services extends to other illicit activities,
such as trafficking in persons, whether of migrants or women, arms and
munitions trafficking, drug trafficking, terrorism, acts to destabilize
legitimate Governments and acts to take forcible control of valuable
natural resources, as well as organized crime such as abduction or the
theft of vehicles on a large scale. None of these aspects falls
strictly under article 47 of Protocol Additional I to the Geneva
Conventions, nor is it applicable by extension. A revision of the legal
definition of mercenaries should produce a concept that is broad enough
to take into account the various types of crimes involving mercenary
activity. This observation is also valid in respect of the 1989
International Convention which had not yet entered into force.
75. Mercenaries have usually been soldiers who have received military
training, and above all are former members of special units or commando
units or parachutists and have experience in the use of sophisticated
weapons. This is in particular the case of those recruited to take part
in combat and to train those who are to make up battalions, columns or
commando units. The mere fact that it is a Government that recruits
mercenaries or hires companies that recruit mercenaries, either in its
own defence or to provide reinforcements in armed conflicts, does not
make such actions any less illegal or illegitimate. Governments are
authorized to operate solely under the Constitution and the
international treaties to which they are parties. This point should be
taken into account in an broader legal definition of mercenaries.
76. The aim of the rules of customary international and treaty law is,
in essence, to combat mercenary acts in the broad sense of the buying
and selling of military services that are not subject to prevailing
standards of international humanitarian law applying to armed conflicts
and that are likely to lead to war crimes and human rights violations.
If nationals of the affected country are used, they cannot, strictly
speaking, be considered mercenaries, but on the part of those recruiting
them the aim of using them as mercenaries is objectively undeniable, as
is the willingness of such nationals to accept a relationship that turns
them into mercenaries. Therefore, the requirement to be a non-national
of the country in which the mercenary becomes involved should also be
reviewed and analysed more carefully, so as to give greater weight in
the definition to the nature and purpose of the illicit act with which
an agent is paid to be associated. In brief, the information summarized
here, although not complete, demonstrates the need to establish a legal
definition of mercenaries that covers the various ways in which they act
so that mercenarism in general can be effectively sanctioned and curbed
by law.
(....)
V. CONCLUSIONS
(..)
85. The Special Rapporteur has noted that private security and military
assistance companies are investing increasingly in information
technology, financial investigation services, military communication
detection systems and electronic security systems. These companies are
present in various African, American and European countries. The
Special Rapporteur notes that these companies are continuing to hire
mercenaries and that, more recently, pilots, aircrews and air
bombardment specialists are being hired by air transport companies
which, in third countries, are involved in illegal trafficking in arms
and munitions, drugs, diamonds and troops. Not all these private
companies recruit mercenaries, but the novelty of the offer, the
efficiency promised in situations that used to be reserved exclusively
for State action and the fact that such companies are at the same time
polyvalent, versatile and technologically well-equipped, could well draw
them into intervening directly in armed conflicts of the countries with
which they have signed contracts. The temptation, in such a scenario,
of recruiting mercenaries to carry out such intervention is an
inescapable reality.
86. Available data indicate that, as a result of the activities of such
companies, demand for military experts, commandos, parachutists,
explosives experts, airplane and helicopter pilots, cabin personnel,
doctors and nurses who, in return for payment, agree to act as
mercenaries has increased. However the prevailing view does not suggest
that the demand for and supply of mercenaries is regulated by market
forces but rather that it is the very existence of such companies that
has boosted the demand. Efforts should therefore be made to ensure the
international regulation and monitoring of these companies which offer
military security internationally so as to prohibit in clear terms
direct involvement in armed conflicts and the recruitment of
mercenaries.
87. All the work done by the Office of the Special Rapporteur since its
creation makes it abundantly clear that there is a direct relationship
between mercenary activities and the human rights of the peoples
affected by the criminal activities of mercenaries. Article 1 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and article 1 of
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
proclaim the right of all peoples to self-determination. Mercenary
activities, by impeding the exercise of the right to self-determination,
constitute a violation of human rights. Mercenaries also violate human
rights by committing crimes, carrying out executions, torture and other
illegal acts referred to in international instruments.
88. More than 11 years after the General Assembly's adoption of the
International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and
Training of Mercenaries, 21 States have agreed to be bound by this
instrument. Thus only one more State is needed to meet the requirement
for its entry into force.
(...)
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
(...)
93. ...The Commission should also be provided with studies on the extent
and regulation of private offers of military security services on the
international market, on the recruitment and use of mercenaries by these
companies and on their implications for the enjoyment of human rights.
92. The studies referred to in the previous paragraphs should analyse
the presence of mercenaries in military security companies and their
involvement in violations of human rights and international humanitarian
law. They should also, in the light of the acts committed, analyse the
individual responsibility of mercenaries, of the companies for which
they work and of the States or belligerent insurgent or paramilitary
groups by which they are hired. A particularly careful analysis should
be made of the responsibility of these companies, when they act on
behalf of paramilitary organizations by providing instructors, for the
acts committed by these organizations.
[Source: Report on the question of the use of mercenaries as a means of
violating human rights and impeding the exercise of the right of peoples
to self-determination, submitted by Mr. Enrique Bernales Ballesteros,
Special Rapporteur, pursuant to Commission resolution 2000/3 -
Commission on Human Rights, Fifty-seventh session, Item 5 of the
provisional agenda - E/CN.4/2001/19 - 11Jan01]
---------------------------------------
Nizkor Int. Human Rights Team
Derechos Human Rights
Serpaj Europe
Information
03May01
"CURRENT TRENDS" ON WAR OUTSOURCING....
Ed Soyster is a retired three-star general and the former director of
the super-secret Defense Intelligence Agency, but in his conservative
brown business suit, he looks more like Willy Loman than James Bond.
It's a chilly Tuesday morning in February, and Soyster has just greeted
me at the door of Military Professional Resources, Inc. (MPRI), a
rapidly growing firm based in Alexandria, VA, for which he is the
spokesperson.
MPRI's headquarters - located in a five-story office building next to a
Best Western motel off the George Washington Parkway - appears as
nondescript as Soyster. The reception-area coffee table is covered with
old issues of Vanity Fair, CondeNast Traveler, Food & Wine and other
standard fare. The firm's name and corporate logo, a golden sword, are
embossed on the front door. Aside from the vaguely martial insignia,
nothing otherwise distinguishes MPRI from the thousands of beltway
bandit firms that ring Greater Washington.
Given the nature of its business, MPRI's low profile probably is not a
coincidence. Despite this bland facade, MPRI has emerged as the leading
player in a controversial field that critics call "Mercenary, Inc."
Defenders prefer the more innocuous "military service provider,"
arguing
that these 21st-century exporters of war strategy are a far cry from the
soldiers of fortune of the past. The firm's mission is to discreetly
train foreign armies - often ones with atrocious human rights records -
that are allied with the United States. The industry, though still in
its infancy, is booming. So much so that last year MPRI was bought, on
undisclosed terms, by L-3 Communications [ticker: LLL], a nearly
$3-billion per year New York-based company that manufactures high-tech
goods, primarily for the Pentagon.
MPRI's corporate ranks are filled with dozens of retired officers. In
fact, outside of the Pentagon, which is conveniently located just 10
minutes away, there are few places where you'll find such a gathering of
high-powered military men. As we head back to his office, Soyster points
out the office of MPRI's president, retired General Carl Vuono, U.S.
Army chief of staff during the Gulf War, and introduces me to another
retired general, Ron Griffiths, an executive vice president and a former
Army vice chief of staff. Though he's not in on the day I arrive,
Vuono's reputation precedes him: He's a meat-and-potatoes military man
and former combat arms officer who commanded two battalions in Vietnam.
To hear it from Soyster, MPRI sells a product that's utterly
conventional. In fact, he jokes during my brief tour of the office, the
parent firm L-3 is a publicly traded corporation, "so anyone with a
401(k) retirement plan is probably an investor in our company." Of
course, most companies don't go looking for business in countries rife
with war and conflict.
During the past few years, MPRI has worked with a group of countries
that sounds like a casting call for next year's edition of Fielding's
The World's Most Dangerous Places: Bosnia, Colombia, Equatorial Guinea
and Nigeria.
The incentive to join up with MPRI, industry watchers say, is money.
Though the firm does not disclose the pay of its top officers, analysts
say they expect all ranks make more than their U.S. military
equivalents. But Soyster resists the notion that MPRI employees are
rolling in cash - he says a colonel actually makes less if he teaches an
ROTC course for MPRI than he made before retiring, but could make more
than his U.S. Army counterparts if he is posted overseas for the firm.
In any case, Soyster says, there's not much incentive for servicemen and
women to quit and join MPRI, since the bump in pay is not dramatic, and
because, like any contracting business, the work can be uncertain.
The Pentagon and the CIA have long used private contractors for a
variety of tasks, from building base infrastructure to assisting with
covert operations. But today's scenario differs greatly from past
practice. MPRI and other private military companies (PMCs) are not CIA
cutouts but huge corporations with diverse interests. Their work is
implemented not by CIA-trained foreign locals, but by high-ranking U.S.
military officers fresh out of the armed forces.
Driving the proliferation of PMCs are the huge cutbacks in the number of
U.S. armed forces personnel following the end of the Cold War. Between
1985 - the height of the Reagan-era military buildup - and 1999, troop
levels have fallen by an average of 30 percent, thereby stretching the
Pentagon's ability to carry out certain tasks. "Private companies
augment our ability to provide foreign training," explains retired
Lieutenant General Larry Skibbie, now at the National Defense Industrial
Association. "We'll see more and more of this as we continue to cut back
on our uniformed forces."
Indeed, PMCs are effectively an arm of foreign policy. Before offering
military assistance to foreign governments, PMCs must apply for a
license from the State Department's Office of Defense Trade Controls,
which oversees the emerging field. "License requests are very carefully
reviewed," says an official at SAIC, a San Diego-based firm (with 14,000
employees in Greater Washington and 41,000 worldwide) that dabbles in
PMC work. "Even when you're just at the talking stage, there is a very
high level of scrutiny." SAIC, by the way, also spawned a historically
significant technology company: Network Solutions, the firm that once
held exclusive rights to Internet domain name registration.
Critics charge that the use of private military contractors allows the
United States to pursue its geopolitical interests without deploying its
own army, this being especially useful in cases where training is
provided to regimes with dubious human rights records. And if a
contractor's employee gets killed overseas, it doesn't provoke nearly as
much political uproar as does the death of an American soldier. "It's
foreign policy by proxy," Dan Nelson, a professor at the George C.
Marshall European Center for Security Studies in Garmisch, Germany, and
a former visiting scholar at the U.S. Department of State and the
Department of Defense, says of the use of PMCs. "Corporate entities are
used to perform tasks that the government, for budgetary reasons or
political sensitivities, cannot carry out."
Multinational corporations, particularly those operating in countries
where governments exert little control over their territory, are also
turning to private contractors for help. In Africa, a number of U.S. and
European PMCs stand guard at mining sites, oil fields and other economic
installations. (Unlike some PMCs, MPRI does not perform guard duty for
corporate clients, but only works for governments). "Companies need to
protect their assets and shareholder value," says Michael Grunberg, an
official with Sandline, a prominent British PMC. "It's like posting a
guard at the bank."
There are just a few dozen American PMCs, and few of those dominate the
business. In Saudi Arabia, a subsidiary of TRW called Vinnell trains the
National Guard, which is deemed to be more reliable than the army and
protects the royal family and strategic facilities such as oil
installations. Vinnell has about 1,000 employees in Saudi Arabia - many
of them U.S. Army Special Forces veterans - who are based at five
National Guard sites. During the Gulf War, Vinnell employees were
deployed along with Saudi units and got bonus pay for hazardous duty.
AirScan, a firm based in Titusville, FL, works for the Pentagon, the Air
Force and a variety of multinational corporations. The company's
promotional literature says that its "experienced crews, effective
systems, and complete integration with ground forces" allow AirScan to
"accurately direct ground personnel to the threat [and provide]
observation and communication required for successful security
operations." AirScan has worked for Chevron in Angola, where it served
with the local military in seeking to protect the oil company's
operations against a guerrilla threat. More recently, AirScan surfaced
in Colombia, where it helps the army and Occidental Petroleum protect
pipelines from leftist guerrillas who have been fighting the government
there for nearly four decades.
DynCorp, a company based in Reston, VA, with annual revenues that top $1
billion, does business with a host of government agencies and has
interests that range from environmental cleanup and information
technology to the more murky areas of national security. In Colombia,
the company works under contract with the State Department in providing
pilots, trainers and maintenance workers for the Colombian government's
vast aerial eradication program to destroy drug crops. PMCs aren't
supposed to be engaged in combat - but in late February, several DynCorp
workers flew into the middle of a firefight, landing their helicopter to
rescue the crew of a police chopper brought down by leftist guerrillas.
DynCorp is also involved on the frontlines of various other Latin
American drug wars. In the early 1990s, the State Department hired the
company for the ostensible purpose of maintaining helicopters then on
loan to Peruvian police. In 1992, three DynCorp employees died when one
of those helicopters was hit by fire from Shining Path guerrillas while
flying over a major coca-growing region. Two of the casualties turned
out to be former covert-ops specialists, including Robert Hitchman, a
former Marine Corps fighter pilot who worked for Air America (the CIA's
airline and covert operations front in Indochina during the 1960s).
Another of DynCorp's near- casualties, though in a far different
context, was CEO Dan Bannister. He was scheduled to be on the 1996
military flight in the Balkans that crashed and killed all aboard,
including then- Commerce Secretary Ron Brown, but decided at the last
minute to skip it. "I am the luckiest man alive," Bannister said in
press accounts after the crash.
In business terms, MPRI has shot up through the ranks. When retired
General Vernon Lewis founded the firm in 1988, MPRI had just three
full-time employees. Its payroll climbed to 40 in 1992 and 850 today,
plus a database of some 12,000 retired military personnel who can be
called upon to handle contract work. Revenues have also soared, from $4
million in 1995 to $70 million last year.
It was that sort of growth that led L-3 Communications - founded in 1997
as a spin-off of 10 electronics manufacturing divisions of Lockheed
Martin - to swoop in and purchase MPRI. L-3 hasn't done so badly,
either: Its tripled in size since its founding, and the company's stock
price has roughly doubled during the past 12 months. The deal was
unusual in that L-3 primarily sells hardware, including flight
recorders, control systems for satellites and the controlled momentum
gyroscope that keeps the International Space Station in its orbit,
whereas MPRI sells services. (Founder Vernon Lewis stepped down as CEO
two years ago and became chairman of the board. When L-3 bought the
company, the MPRI board was phased out, and Lewis has had no role with
the firm since. He was, of course, a shareholder at the time L-3
purchased the company.)
Frank Lanza, L-3's chairman and CEO, believes privatization of military
services will continue to expand and sees MPRI as a hot property with
"competitive advantages" that no other training business can match.
"It's a well-managed company with double-digit profit margins," he
says
in a phone conversation from his New York office. Lanza acknowledges
MPRI's military training programs are controversial and says that's made
him view its overseas ventures with caution. "They can't go anywhere
without government approval, but there could still be negative public
opinion," he says. "We're sensitive to that and watching it very
closely
so we don't get involved in a situation by accident."
Lanza's upbeat assessment is shared by industry-watcher Deborah Avant, a
professor of political science and international affairs at George
Washington University who is working on a book about PMCs. "Technically,
MPRI has competitors, but it's got a unique mix of personnel and
connections," she says. "They pretty much have a corner on their piece
of the market."
During its early years, MPRI maintained a cool, if not downright
suspicious, relationship with the press. There are still some areas that
Soyster prefers not to discuss, but the firm has become increasingly
accessible to the media. Indeed, given some of the things I've written
about MPRI in the past - "mercenary" is one of the more polite
appellations I've used to describe the company - Soyster's very consent
to an interview was somewhat unexpected. The company makes every effort
to be seen as just another business entity - its website www.mpri.com
is
filled with lingo that could be pulled off almost any corporate site.
It's just that this site's "job opportunities" section includes
headings
like: "Kuwait - Infantry."
As he explains in his office (Soyster apologizes that he can't give me a
full slideshow presentation in the nearby conference room, as it is
being used to host the new ambassador to Nigeria, a company client),
MPRI has three distinct divisions. The National Group, headed by retired
Lieutenant General Jerry Bates, develops curriculum for the Pentagon's
War Colleges, tests new military equipment and trains troops to use it,
and runs ROTC programs at more than 200 universities. Joe Wolfinger, a
former deputy director of the FBI, runs the Alexandria Group, which was
introduced last year. It handles training for law enforcement agencies,
offers seminars in leader development, and conducts background
investigations for government and corporate clients. The International
Group, headed by former General Crosbie Saint, who commanded the U.S.
Army in Europe between 1988 and 1992, handles foreign training programs.
Though it generates just 40 percent of MPRI's revenues, the
International Group has attracted by far the most public scrutiny.
Soyster vehemently objects to the description of MPRI as a "mercenary"
firm, saying that the work of the International Group is restricted to
training, education on the military's role in a democracy, leader
development and strategic planning. "We've all carried guns and used
them, but we don't do so for MPRI," he states emphatically, adding that
company employees on assignment overseas dress in business suits, not
military uniforms. MPRI has even turned down contracts - for example,
guarding
overseas embassies - which would require its staff to carry weapons, for
fear of bad publicity. "The scenario we're afraid of is that a situation
gets out of hand and one of our guys has to shoot someone," he tells me
as he fingers the black gemstone on his 1957 class ring from West Point.
"You just know that it's not gonna be the head of the group who gets
shot, but a 21-year-old pregnant woman. It's not worth the risk."
With his straight-shooting bonhomie, Soyster is easy to like. He's great
fun to shoot the breeze with - after all, he's led an interesting career
and has the stories to back it up.
That's probably a key reason why he's the go-to guy to tell the firm's
story. Soyster says MPRI got its first big overseas contract in 1994,
when Croatia hired the firm to advise its military forces. The company
dispatched a team to Zagreb that arrived during a period of particularly
intense fighting between Croat and Serb forces. "The Croatians saw their
future with the West, not the East," says Soyster, who says MPRI's role
was limited to classroom instruction on tactics and did not include
training in battlefield tactics. "They wanted to join NATO's Partnership
for Peace program, and we helped them achieve that."
Yet just months after MPRI's arrival, Croatia's army - which until MPRI
came on the scene had been viewed as bumbling and inept - launched a
series of bloody and highly successful offensives against Serb forces.
Most important was Operation Lightning Storm, the assault on the Krajina
region during which Serbian villages were sacked and burned, hundreds of
civilians were killed and some 170,000 people were driven from their
homes. Soyster says that MPRI, like the U.S. government, knew the attack
on the Krajina would take place and that perhaps half a dozen officers
who graduated from its training seminars took part in the operation.
Otherwise, he insists, the company played no role in the Krajina
campaign. "It's impossible, no matter how good you are, to turn around
an army in a few months," he says. "But it's a great myth. It's good
for
our business."
MPRI's contract with Croatia has been renewed several times, and it
still has a team in Zagreb today, though its presence there no longer
attracts much attention. The firm is also at work in neighboring Bosnia,
which picked MPRI to train its new armed forces after winning
independence from the former Yugoslavia in 1996. As part of that program
- which is overseen by the U.S. government but paid for by Saudi Arabia,
Kuwait, Brunei and Malaysia - MPRI has designed a combat-training
center, set up the Ministry of Defense, and helped establish an army
that Soyster says is designed to handle defensive tasks. At the
program's peak, MPRI had 230 former officers in Bosnia. "We had about 30
colonels over there, five divisions' worth," Soyster boasts. "The U.S.
Army can't send those kind of numbers."
MPRI is also expanding in Africa, where it is helping implement the
Pentagon's African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI), a program designed
to strengthen U.S. ties to African nations and create an indigenous
"peace- keeping" force on the continent. Seven nations are
participating
in ACRI - Benin, Ghana, the Ivory Coast, Malawi, Mali, Senegal and
Uganda - with MPRI's role being to provide leadership training. None of
those nations has a stellar human rights record.
Elsewhere in Africa, MPRI has a $7-million contract with the U.S. Agency
for International Development (USAID) to instruct the Nigerian military,
which ruled the country for almost 15 years before turning power over to
civilians in 1999. MPRI is also training the new Coast Guard in
Equatorial Guinea, which recently uncovered huge offshore oil deposits.
That country is headed by a government that the conservative human
rights group Freedom House rates, along with countries like Burma, North
Korea and Iraq, as having one of the world's worst records on political
and civil liberties.
Soyster traveled to Equatorial Guinea last year to kick off MPRI's work
and has met on five occasions with the president of the country, Teodoro
Obiang Nguema Mbasogo.
On other continents, MPRI's clients have ranged from the benign - such
as Sweden, where the armed forces were briefed on the Gulf War - to the
questionable. In Colombia, for example, MPRI helped the Ministry of
Defense, in Soyster's words, "reorganize and orient itself toward
counter-drug operations" on a contract paid for by the Pentagon. Soyster
concedes that MPRI's clients frequently aren't poster children for
political freedom, but he says that's exactly the point of working with
them. "There's no point in training the Queen's Islanders," he says.
"To
control human rights violations you need a well-trained, efficient army.
Wringing your hands is not going to solve the problem."
He walks over to a bookshelf and pulls out a three-ring binder with
seminar materials that the company has used to instruct African military
officers. "Let us all be clear on this point," reads a section of text
he points to. "The establishment and maintenance of civilian control and
oversight of the military form the foundation upon which the stability
of democracy is built." Looking up from the page, Soyster says that he
and his colleagues at MPRI have devoted 30 years of their lives to a
system in which the military is subordinate to elected leadership. "That
guy over there on the wall" - here he points to a picture of former
General Douglas McArthur that accompanies a framed newspaper story from
the 1950s - "had a problem with President Truman. As you may recall, the
president won." But not all of the firm's clients have learned the
lesson: In the Ivory Coast, the military seized power less than a week
after MPRI concluded its instruction, though no one suggests there was a
link between the coursework and the coup.
For better or for worse, PMCs are here to stay. According to Soyster,
MPRI has potential deals brewing across the globe, from Poland in Europe
to Argentina in South America to Bahrain in the Middle East. "You're
probably not gonna hear people say they're going to MPRI-ize their
country the way you Hoover your apartment in England," he says while
walking me back to the front door and heading out to an appointment,
"but we are developing a pretty good brand name."
[Source: Washington Business Forward - By Ken Silverstein - 26Apr01]
------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------
RELATED LINKS:
International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and
Training of Mercenaries - A/RES/44/34, 72nd plenary meeting, 4 December
1989 [Not entered into force yet].
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/44/a44r034.htm
Documents on Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on use
of mercenaries as a means of impeding the exercise of the right of
peoples to self-determination
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu2/7/b/mmer.htm
Intelligence and Extermination Networks in Barrancabermeja,
Colombia.[SPA/ESP]
http://www.derechos.org/nizkor/colombia/libros/redes/index.html
Organization and Operation of Intelligence Networks - Colombian Armed
Forces Directive No. 200-05/91.
http://www.derechos.org/nizkor/colombia/doc/directive.htm
Plan Colombia: An Strategy Without A Solution. By OIDHACO
http://www.derechos.org/nizkor/colombia/doc/oidhaco
- European Parliament resolution on Plan Colombia and support for the
peace process in Colombia. 01feb01.
http://www.derechos.org/nizkor/europa/parlamento/PEcoleng01feb.html
- The Office of the High Commissionner for Human Rights report on the HR
situation in Colombia is available on:
http://www.unhchr.ch/SearchForm.nsf/SymbolNumberSearchEng?OpenForm
by introducing the Document Symbol Number [ E/CN.4/2001/15 ] into the
search rectangle.
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Information is an Urgent Solidarity service edited and disseminated by
Nizkor International
Human Rights Team. Nizkor is a member of the Peace and Justice
Service-Europe (Serpaj),
Derechos Human Rights (USA) and GILC (Global Internet Liberty Campaign).
PO Box 156037 - 28080 - Madrid - Espanha. Telephone: +34.91.526.7502
Fax: +34.91.526.7515 http://www.equiponizkor.org
Mailto: eng@equiponizkor.org
- The content of this message is protected
under
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XIII-Chapter XI.
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