Ploughshares on Canadian Nuclear Policy
By Bill Robinson
The Canadian government's new nuclear weapons policy takes some
significant steps in the direction the anti-nuclear movement has been
recommending, but it also remains disappointingly mired in the nuclear
theology of the NATO Alliance.
The Canadian government released its response to the Standing Committee
on Foreign Affairs and International Trade's nuclear policy report,
Canada and the Nuclear Challenge (see March 1999 Monitor), on 19 April.
The response came in the form of two documents, a statement entitled
Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation: Advancing Canadian Objectives
and a companion document entitled Government Response to the
Recommendations of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and
International Trade on Canada's Nuclear Disarmament and
Non-Proliferation Policy.[1] The final product of a review process that
lasted nearly three years, the two documents spell out in detail how the
government proposes to address nuclear weapons issues at the beginning
of the 21st century.
The government's new nuclear policy contains elements worthy of both
celebration and condemnation. While it places one foot on the solid
shore of nuclear disarmament and global security, it leaves the other
stranded on the rusty hulk of NATO nuclear doctrine, dubbing the awkward
straddle that results "an appropriate balance" between Canada's
disarmament objectives and its security requirements. (DFAIT 1999b, p.
1)
A "balance" it may be, but a long-term sustainable posture it is not.
Nuclear abolition
Canadian governments have long expressed a commitment to the eventual
elimination of nuclear weapons. But, in practice, this commitment has
been treated as a matter not for the present but for some unimaginable
time in the distant future - bearing few if any consequences for current
activities. Project Ploughshares asked the Canadian government to "adopt
nuclear abolition as a real objective, calling on the nuclear weapons
states and other states to begin negotiations on a convention to
eliminate all nuclear weapons." The report of the Standing Committee on
Foreign Affairs and International Trade (SCFAIT) generally supported
this position, recommending that the government "support the call for
the conclusion of a nuclear weapons disarmament convention" and
"encourage the nuclear-weapon States to demonstrate their unequivocal
commitment to enter into and conclude negotiations leading to the
elimination of nuclear weapons."
Unfortunately, there is little in the new policy to indicate that the
government accepted the call to make abolition a real objective. The
SCFAIT declined to recommend a target date for the elimination of
nuclear weapons, but it implied that the process should take less than
half a century. The government has no such vision. It accepted that "The
only sustainable strategy for the future is the elimination of nuclear
weapons entirely," (DFAIT 1999a, p. 1) but it also signed NATO's latest
Strategic Concept document, approved at the 23-24 April Washington
Summit, which declares that NATO will retain nuclear weapons "for the
foreseeable future." (NATO 1999a, para. 46)
The new policy rejects negotiation of a nuclear weapons convention as
"premature" (DFAIT 1999b, p. 25) and sidesteps the call to encourage the
Nuclear Weapon States to "demonstrate their unequivocal commitment" to
nuclear abolition, arguing instead that "For the foreseeable future, it
will be up to the Nuclear Weapon States to negotiate among themselves
the reduction of their nuclear arsenals." (DFAIT 1999b, p. 6)
The SCFAIT also recommended that the government "work consistently to
reduce the political legitimacy and value of nuclear weapons" as a means
of contributing to their reduction and eventual elimination. The
government did endorse this recommendation, pledging that it "will
continue to stress the necessity to devalue the political significance
of these weapons" (DFAIT 1999a, p. 19) and "will also continue to resist
any movement to validate nuclear weapons as acceptable currency in
international politics." (DFAIT 1999b, p. 1) Here, too, however, the
government's commitment must be read in the context of the new Strategic
Concept, which proclaims that "The fundamental purpose of the nuclear
forces of the Allies is political," and that in this regard they "fulfil
an essential role." (NATO 1999a, para. 62)
Immediate measures
Project Ploughshares also recommended that the government support a
number of immediate measures to reduce the threat currently posed by
nuclear arsenals and pave the way towards abolition, including adoption
of a "no-first-use" policy and the de-alerting of nuclear forces and
placement of their warheads in storage. Here the picture is more
positive.
The call to de-alert nuclear forces, which the SCFAIT also strongly
advocated, was accepted by the government, which announced that it
"supports the concept of de-alerting and other measures which contribute
to the safety and security of nuclear arsenals and the stability of
U.S.-Russian strategic nuclear relations.... The Government also
supports de-mating (separating warheads and/or guidance systems from
their delivery vehicles) which provides an even larger measure of safety
and stability.... Canada calls on both Russia and the U.S. to negotiate
to de-alert and de-mate their nuclear arsenals to the maximum extent
possible." (DFAIT 1999b, p. 8)
The government declined to comment, however, on the suggestion made by
many groups that simple de-alerting measures ought to be implemented
before the end of 1999 to ensure against any accident caused by the Y2K
computer problem. It also declined to comment on the suggestion,
recommended by the SCFAIT, that the other Nuclear Weapon States and
nuclear-weapons-capable states be brought into a de-alerting agreement.
Nonetheless, the government's support for de-alerting and de-mating is
an extremely important and highly welcome development in government
policy.
The question of no-first-use is a more delicate one for the government,
as it would require an explicit reversal in stated NATO policy. It was
apparently for this reason that neither the SCFAIT nor the government
was willing to formally embrace the suggestion. Both did imply, however,
that Canada would support such a change. The government's response
noted, in particular, that "Canada will continue to express the view
that its understanding of nuclear deterrence is that the only function
of nuclear weapons is to deter the use by others of nuclear weapons,
notwithstanding that nuclear weapons may have a deterrent effect in the
mind of a potential aggressor." (DFAIT 1999a, p. 19) This view of the
function of nuclear weapons is essentially the same as the view taken by
the Canberra Commission.
Like-minded states
The anti-nuclear movement and the SCFAIT both proposed that Canada could
pursue its nuclear disarmament goals more effectively if it worked in
concert with like-minded states such as the members of the New Agenda
Coalition and reform-minded members of NATO. This recommendation was
broadly accepted by the government, which had in fact already begun to
undertake such efforts, working to build support among NATO members for
a New Agenda Coalition-sponsored United Nations resolution during the
fall of 1998 and spearheading, along with Germany, efforts within NATO
to build support for revisions in nuclear policy.
The government's response states that Canada proposed "that the Alliance
agree at the Washington Summit that NATO review its nuclear policy and
its relationship to proliferation, arms control and disarmament
developments." (DFAIT 1999b, p. 27)
Such a review was indeed agreed at the Washington Summit, which
announced that "In the light of overall strategic developments and the
reduced salience of nuclear weapons, the Alliance will consider options
for confidence and security-building measures, verification,
non-proliferation and arms control and disarmament. The Council in
Permanent Session will propose a process to Ministers in December for
considering such options." (NATO 1999b, para. 32)
Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy assured the House of Commons afterwards
that this statement "issued clear instructions that there would be a
review of the nuclear policy for NATO." (Hansard 1999) However, NATO
officials denied in a recent meeting with the International Physicians
for the Prevention of Nuclear War that NATO's nuclear weapons policies
would form part of the promised review of arms control and related
measures. (Santa Barbara 1999) Clearly, high-level government attention
will be required to prevent NATO officials from sweeping the issue under
the carpet.
As for future Canadian co-operation with the New Agenda Coalition, the
degree to which such co-operation will actually take place remains to be
seen. Anti-nuclear groups would have liked to see Canada formally join
the New Agenda Coalition, but the government has made it clear that it
intends to remain outside the group, co-operating only on an ad hoc
basis.
Canada and the "nuclear umbrella"
Finally, Project Ploughshares and other anti-nuclear groups called on
the Canadian government to renounce Canadian reliance on the "nuclear
umbrella" and bring an end to Canadian support for the nuclear weapons
of other countries (such activities range from political and diplomatic
support for NATO's nuclear policies to the provision of airspace and
facilities for nuclear bomber training and the hosting of visits by
nuclear armed submarines at Nanoose, British Columbia). Neither the
SCFAIT nor the government addressed these questions, however.
The government did promise that it "will continue to urge NATO partners
to consider the impact on potential nuclear proliferators when
considering the characterization of the purpose of NATO nuclear forces,"
(DFAIT 1999b, p. 27) but it appears as yet unwilling to acknowledge that
its own practice of continuing to treat those weapons as a useful even
necessary element of Canada's defences might also undermine collective
non-proliferation efforts. This position is perhaps justifiable if its
purpose is to avoid a public break that might undermine Canada's ability
to work for changes in the nuclear policies of NATO as a whole, but it
cannot be seen as a position that is sustainable over the long term.
Conclusions
There is much to applaud in the government's policy statement. Its
support for de-alerting/de-mating, for example, and its apparent
determination to work for changes in NATO's nuclear policies are
important and commendable initiatives. The new policy makes it clear
that the Canadian government is not yet willing to abandon the NATO
nuclear ship, but it does confirm that the government has begun to
develop a commendable interest in tugging the derelict vessel closer to
shore.
The new policy's chief failing is that it continues to define immediate
efforts such as these to be the only possibilities for progress for the
"foreseeable future." What makes these steps foreseeable but abolition
not? The government can be reasonably sure that achievement of its more
limited goals is not impossible, and it can be reasonably sure that by
bending its efforts towards those ends it will make their achievement
more likely. To this extent and no more is any element of the future
"foreseeable" to the human race.
But these factors also apply to the abolition of nuclear weapons. There
is no reason to believe that the abolition of nuclear weapons is
impossible. And it is only through the efforts of all countries,
including Canada, that we can hope to succeed in making nuclear
abolition a reality. Where is the wisdom, then, in abandoning "for the
foreseeable future" the very goal that the government itself recognizes
to be the "only sustainable strategy for the future"?
The government acknowledges that nuclear weapons must go: "Given their
catastrophic potential and the frailties of human nature, the only safe
and realistic course is to eliminate them." (DFAIT 1999a, p. 19)
What a shame, then, that it is unable to foresee a future without them.
1 The full text of the reports can be found on the internet at
http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/nucchallenge/menu-e.htm.
References
DFAIT (Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade) 1999a,
Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation: Advancing Canadian
Objectives, April.
DFAIT 1999b, Government Response to the Recommendations of the Standing
Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade on Canada's Nuclear
Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Policy, April.
Hansard (House of Commons Debates) 1999, 27 April.
NATO 1999a, "The Alliance's Strategic Concept," Press Communique
NAC-S(99)65, 24 April.
NATO 1999b, "Washington Summit Communique," Press Communique
NAC-S(99)64, 24 April.
Santa Barbara, Joanna 1999, "Informal Report on IPPNW Delegation to
NATO, Brussels, June 9, 1999," distributed on CNANW e-mail list, 17
June.
--
Bill Robinson, Project Ploughshares,
Conrad Grebel College, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada N2L 3G6
Phone: 519 888-6541 x264 Fax: 519 885-0806
E-mail: brobinson@ploughshares.ca
http://www.ploughshares.ca
Project Ploughshares is a member of the Canadian Network to Abolish
Nuclear Weapons (http://watserv1.uwaterloo.ca/~plough/cnanw/cnanw.html)