Presentation made by Denis Tougas for The Round Table on Human
Rights in
Congo Kinshasa on behalf of Entr'aide Missionaire and several Canadian
NGO's (see list at end) to Canadian Consultation on Human Rights, Feb 28,
2001 sponsored by Foreign Affairs in Ottawa.
Proposals for Canadian government policy towards
Congo and Central africa Region.
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TABLE DE CONCERTATION SUR LES DROITS HUMAINS AU CONGO/KINSHASA
Entraide Missionnaire - 15 Rue de Castenau Ouest, Montreal, Quebec (Qc)
H2R 2W3 - Tel: (514) 270-6089 Fax: (514) 270-6156
Canada must get involved in a concrete, coherent fashion in the Congo
The change of leadership in the Kinshasa government and its claim to be
looking for peace ought to produce a real and more coherent involvement on
the part of Canada and the international community in the return of peace
and democracy to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and to the whole of
the region.
Until now, the war which has been tearing the Congo apart since August
1998 has received so little attention in Western capitals that it looks
like callousness in the face of a situation without precedent in Africa.
According to the most recent estimates, two million people have been
displaced inside the country, and a million of them are without any
humanitarian aid, because of the difficulties reaching them. Six foreign
countries (Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Angola, Zimbabwe, and Namibia) have
troops stationed in the DRC while most of the countries sharing borders,
particularly Congo/Brazzaville, the Central African Republic, and the
Zambia, have been affected during the last few months by the arrival of
more than 300,000 refugees.
If we consider the international community's interventions in attempts to
resolve other political and humanitarian crises in the world, in Kosovo or
in West Timor, for example, we cannot help but see the application of a
double standard where the Congo crisis is concerned. Far from the
television cameras, the «first African World War»has gone on to general
indifference, which has allowed the real nature of the conflict to stay
long hidden. It was not until June, 2000, that, in Resolution 1304, the
Security Council admitted that the Congo was the victim of a «violation of
its sovereignty and territorial integrity» by Rwanda and Uganda, and
demanded the withdrawal of their forces.
Canada and the international community should take advantage of the
apparent willingness displayed by all parties involved in the conflict to
support the peace process more actively, rather than the reverse, as the
resolution adopted by the Security Council on February 23, would suggest,
when it reduced the size of the UN Mission to the Congo (MONUC) from 5,500
to 3,000 men. It is an illusion to believe that a conflict of this size
can be resolved without a more serious commitment from the international
community.
The priority: territorial integrity and national sovereignty
Two and a half years of war have seriously imperilled the country's
territorial integrity and national sovereignty. The Congo today is divided
into distinct parts, totally dependent on foreign countries for their
defence or essential components of their political, social or economic
activities. A return to territorial integrity and national sovereignty in
the Congo should be the priority guiding Canada and the international
community's actions, while taking the security concerns of neighbouring
countries into account.
To do this:
S international law should take precedence . . . and forces of
occupation
should withdraw without delay. This withdrawal should be swiftly
followed
by that of all other foreign troops as Security Council Resolutions 1304
(June 2000) and 1332 (December 2000) demanded;
S to make this first step towards peace possible, the Security Council must
involve itself more in the resolution of the conflict, by reinforcing
MONUC's mandate and by participating more closely in regional diplomatic
endeavours. After a cease-fire is obtained, observers and interventionary
troops should swiftly be deployed to supervise the disengagement and
withdrawal of troops, to safeguard the people, and ensure the arrival of
humanitarian aid;
S the Lusaka Accord is still the best way to bring peace; however, it
should be updated to include decisions and agreements made on both sides
since it was signed in July, 1999: particularly the Security Council
resolutions and the results of the Maputo I and II and Harare regional
summits (October, November, and December, 2000).
S the Inter-Congolese Dialogue is a matter of Congolese internal politics.
It should be organized without any foreign military interference and should
not be held until a real cease-fire is in force. The question of
«facilitation» should be tackled so as to iron out problems, rather than to
crystalize opposition. If necessary, a team of «facilitators,» accepted by
all parties, should rapidly get to work.
S the thorny problem of the . . . ex-FAR and the Interahamwe, suspected of
having participated in the Rwandan genocide in 1994 must equally concern
the international community. Because they did not intervene to disarm
the
militias in the refugee camps from 1994 to 1996, they are partly
responsible for their presence in the Congo. Leaving the task of
neutralizing them . . . to the Rwandan and Ugandan chiefs of staff, as was
done in 1996, has not stopped the the massacres of civilians. . . .
Ultimately, the question of the use of neighbouring territory by each of
the rebel forces must be solved by regional negotiation between the
sovereign states responsible. By then, MONUC should be positioned on the
frontiers to safeguard the people, to supervise the neutralization of
«negative forces,» and to prevent armed incursions in both directions.
S a lasting peace cannot be secured in the DRC and in the region without a
real respect for civil rights and humanitarian rights. All the parties
involved in the conflict must be convinced that they cannot commit crimes
with impunity. Investigations should be made to bring to light the
violations committed by each of the belligerents and pressure brought about
to bring law and order to the whole region.
International aid as a way of bringing pressure to bear on the
belligerents
Everything possible should be done to bring peace to the region,
including pressure on the belligerents through the granting of bilateral
and multilateral aid.1 There is . . . an obvious inconsistency in the
treatment of countries involved in the same war, particularly in the aid
agreed on by the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
2 to which Canada contributes. The almost unconditional financial support
given to Uganda and Rwanda, including budgetary aid, help with balance of
payments, and remission of debts, is, surely, contributing to the
prolongation of the war, even if indirectly. Can we be certain that this
aid which ought to help to create an environment promoting democratization,
good government, respect for rights and development is not rather serving
to free up funds for forces of occupation? Canada, which refused to remit
Rwanda's debts because of its involvement in the Congo, should extend its
pressure to the other countries involved and make its position felt in the
financial institutions of which it is a member. Canada should also press
for the setting up of systems to follow up and monitor the use of the funds
granted. However, the extreme poverty of the Congolese people calls for a
special effort from those providing international funding to stop the
deterioration of the standard of living of millions of people.
To achieve this, Canada should:
- enlarge its definition of emergency aid so as to include the
reconstruction of infrastructures necessary to end the isolation of many
rural areas;
- support development projects wherever safety permits;
- reinforce Congolese civil society's ability to intervene for peace and
the democratization of the country;
- give particular attention to initiatives targetting the protection of
civil rights;
- support the efforts of different warring ethnic communities to live
together;
- support activities bringing together the civil societies from the
countries involved in the conflict.
Against the illegal exploitation of resources
Without a doubt, access to the plentiful natural resources of the DRC
is
one of the most important motives for the war. Many Canadian companies,
particularly in the mining sector, have been very active in the region
since the mid-nineties. In the present context, where large portions of
the country are administered by rebel groups sponsored by foreigners, the
Canadian government should condemn and oppose any signing of commercial
contracts for Canadian enterprises with any of the rebel authorities, as
they could lead to the breaking up of the country. Canada should also
forbid in its territory the import or use of Congolese products which have
been obtained by illegal exploitation by foreign interests. Finally,
Canada should condemn all looting of Congolese natural resources and all
international complicity in this.
Democracy for the whole region
Finally, if peace is the priority hope for all the people of the
region,
democracy has been their ultimate objective for several decades. It is a
remarkable fact that most of the leaders of the countries involved in the
war came to power through force and take the same stand towards the rebel
movements. It would be unacceptable and unrealistic to ask only the
Congo
to undertake a dialogue with the different opposition groups to set up new
democratic institutions unless the same demands are made of the others. The
return to peace and security cannot be achieved without the democratization
. . . of all the countries in the region.
Montreal, February, 2001
From: The Canadian Centre for Education and International Development
(CECI), Development and Peace, Rights and Democracy, Entraide Missionaire,
Oxfam-Quebec, Terre Sans Frontieres.
Notes
1. CANADA'S TOTAL AID (BILATERAL, MULTI-LATERAL,
NGOS, ETC) FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1998-1999
Statistical Report on Public Aid for Development, ACDI
2. AID TO COUNTRIES AT WAR IN THE CONGO IN 2000
WORLD BANK AND IMF
(Decisions taken from November, '99, budgetary aid in italics)
Taken from "We can do better! The first government and parliament
bulletin.
A year of Belgium's African Policy,
1999 - December, 2000," Broederlijk Delen, Entraide et Fraternite et
Solidarite Mondiale, December, 2000.