Don't blame Africa for its wars
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
By Stephen Lewis and Gerald Caplan
The Globe and Mail, Wednesday, July 12, 2000

Stephen Lewis, a former Canadian ambassador to the United Nations, was a
member of the African-led panel of eminent persons that produced the
report on genocide in Rwanda. Gerald Caplan, a long-time NDP adviser,
wrote the report.

The report on the 1994 Rwanda genocide by a panel chosen by the
Organization of African Unity is tough, outspoken and passionate. What
else could it be? Twenty months of research, listening to hundreds of
people, plus visits to Rwanda, left us shaken not only by the unspeakable
horrors of the genocide itself but by the almost unbelievable record of
shame of members of the international community. On more than one
occasion, the report says: "It is hard to believe that the following
really happened, but . . ."

In fact, the evidence was so strong that it took little difficulty for the
panel -- four leading Africans, an Indian, a Swede and a Canadian -- to
agree unanimously on its findings It's been gratifying that most observers
have reacted to the document in this spirit: Yes, it's angry and tough,
but it's also strictly rooted in the facts of the case.

The one exception to this positive reception has been from those who argue
that the panel seriously erred in attributing most blame to actors
external to Rwanda; the accusation is that we find almost everybody
culpable but the Hutu killers themselves. That makes us "bleeding hearts"
or (ironically) "white paternalists" who are guilty, in the words of a
notably harsh Globe and Mail editorial, of "blaming the bystanders." This
is a criticism we take seriously. We agree that Africa too often and too
blithely has blamed its problems on external factors. But there are three
flaws in this criticism of the panel's report.

First, it's simply inaccurate. In the panel's official press statement
last week, we emphasized that "there would have been no genocide had a
small group among the Rwandan governing elite not deliberately incited the
country's Hutu majority against the Tutsi minority." The text offers a
long, careful reconstruction of the conspiracy of a fanatical clique
around the Rwandan president and his wife to eliminate the Tutsi minority
as well as Hutu dissidents in order to monopolize the spoils of power for
themselves.

On the other hand, to dismiss the genocide as "bloodthirsty tribalism," as
the Globe editorial does, is to dismiss entirely the role of history in
creating modern Rwanda -- an approach The Globe would surely never
countenance for Canada. Besides, such an interpretation comes perilously
close to treating the genocide as just another outbreak of African
savagery -- "Hutu killing Tutsi killing Hutu," in the popular 1994 formula
favoured by those whose ignorance did not impede their strong opinions.

As much as any county, Rwanda's character and nature have been decisively
shaped by the interaction of internal and external actors. Using the best
available research, our report carefully documents the significant role of
external forces during the past century.

They include:
--The Roman Catholic missionaries who concocted a bizarre racist
anthropology pitting allegedly superior Tutsis against allegedly backward
Hutus;
--The Catholic hierarchy, with its unique influence in Rwanda, that failed
to condemn the genocide while it was being planned, while it was
occurring, or since;
--The Belgian colonial masters who introduced apartheid-like ethnic
identity cards that were later used to identify and murder Tutsis;
--The French government's intimate partnership with a Rwandan Hutu
government and military that were up to their necks in inciting hatred
for, and vicious attacks against, any and all Tutsis;
--The U.S. government's insistent refusal to allow the United Nations
Security Council to dispatch a serious military mission to Rwanda before
the genocide, although it was universally known that a terrible disaster
loomed;
--Washington's subsequent stratagems to block reinforcements once the
genocide was in full force;
--The UN Secretariat's repeated dismissals of General Romeo Dallaire's
cries of alarm;
--The Belgian government's withdrawal of troops protecting 2,000 Tutsis in
a schoolyard, leaving every one of them to be slaughtered.

We've made none of this up. It's all systematically recorded and
documented in our report (http://www.oau-oua.org). In the bitter words of
Gen. Dallaire, echoed by his Belgian second-in-command in Rwanda, "the
international community has blood on its hands."

Which raises a third point. All these parties themselves agree they had a
great responsibility for the genocide. Curiously, none of those we single
out agrees with The Globe editorial that they were simple bystanders, at
worst guilty of sins of omission. Bill Clinton, the UN's Kofi Annan, and
Belgium's prime minister have all apologized for their failure to do
anything to prevent or mitigate the genocide. The French government and
the Vatican have refused to apologize for their scandalous roles and,
indeed, both perversely claim they made a positive contribution. But, in
so doing, they at least agree that they had an obligation to act.

In every single case, then, there is an explicit acknowledgement of
responsibility. Each of these key actors has understood that it had an
obligation to intervene in Rwanda in a forceful and positive way. As the
report shows, not a single one chose to do so. As a direct consequence, as
many as 800,000 innocent people died.

It is for precisely this reason that we call for reparations to be paid by
those who abandoned Rwanda in its moment of greatest need. The chief
external culprits who knew perfectly well what was happening and knowingly
allowed it to happen -- the United States, France, Belgium, Britain --
surely must have obligations beyond merely apologizing (and an obstinate
France has never even taken that step). As for the Vatican, a
straightforward confession of sin might well contribute to the difficult
reconciliation process in Rwanda.

The post-Holocaust pledge of "Never again" and the adoption of the 1948 UN
Genocide Convention meant that the international community accepted a
collective obligation to prevent future comparable tragedies. Our report
reminds the world of yet another occasion when it failed in this duty. We
do so in the hope it does not fail again.